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Defamation and Political Comment in Post-Soviet Russia
Elspeth Reid*
Abstract
The law of defamation in Russia has a long history. Its roots are in the European 
tradition, but the discontinuity of its historical development has meant that there 
have been particular difficulties in reconfiguring the law for the new human rights 
era following Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe in 1996 and ratification of 
the European Convention on Human Rights in 1998. Defamation law must now 
be been tested against the fundamental standards enshrined in the ECHR, to ensure 
that appropriate levels of protection are provided not only for reputation but, also, 
for freedom of expression. It has been left largely to the judiciary and judge-made law 
to manage this difficult transition. This article analyses the elements that make up 
the law of defamation in Russia and assesses the challenges that remain in adapting 
it to the twenty-first century. 
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1. Introduction
Protection for personality rights in general, and for honor and reputation in 
particular, has a long history in Russia, as in other European jurisdictions, 
which can be traced back through the pre-revolutionary period to the earliest 
legal texts. Civil remedies for defamation, however, lay dormant in the earlier 
part of the Soviet era, to be partially revived in the 1960s and then extended in 
the 1990s. But this is an area which has encountered particular challenges in 
its reconfiguration for the post-Soviet era. The law of defamation is a “curious 
compound”,1 the composition of which has come under intense scrutiny in many 
systems during the closing decades of the twentieth century. Its elements have 
been adjusted in varying ways in order to combine protection for reputation 
* The author is grateful to the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on a draft of this article. 
The texts of recent Russian cases have been obtained from the websites of the relevant courts, accessible 
through the general portal <http://www.sudrf.ru/> and, also, searchable at <http://actoscope.com/>. 
Unless otherwise stated, all translations in the present article from Russian are by the author. Texts of 
all cases from the European Court of Human Rights, including those not reported in European Human 
Rights Reports (EHRR), are available at the Court’s website, <http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/>.
1  William Page Keeton et al. (eds.), Prosser and Keaton on Torts (West Group, St Paul, MN, 1985, 5th 
ed.), 771.
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with the minimum possible level of interference with freedom of expression.2 
The Russian Federation (RF) too has found itself drawn into this process by its 
accession to the Council of Europe in 1996 and ratification of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1998. The law as contained in the 1994 
RF Civil Code, its basic form still drawn from the Roman law actio iniuriarum, 
has required to become “constitutionalized”, to the extent that the rules on civil 
liability have been tested against the fundamental standards enshrined in the 
ECHR. It has been left largely to the judiciary and judge-made law to manage 
this transition, but with no clear strategy for reconciling traditional sympathy 
for the victim of calumny with modern expectations of freedom of expression, 
and with little consensus as to the relative priority of the interests involved. This 
article analyses the elements that make up the law of defamation in Russia and 
assesses the challenges that remain in adapting it to an age of human rights in 
the twenty-first century. 
1.1. The Terminology of “Defamation”
The term “defamation” is itself problematic. While defamation in the Anglo-
American Common Law was once taken to mean any malicious verbal injury, 
false or true, that affected the reputation of the victim, in modern usage it has 
come to be restricted to false imputations only.3 In Russian, the term “defama-
tion” (“diffamatsiia”) is encountered as the generic term for verbal injury against 
honor and dignity, and remains capable of extending to material for which there 
is a factual basis, as well as to falsehood.4 This term is not, however, to be found 
in legislative texts. More specifically, the modern Russian law breaks this gen-
eral category down into: (i) civil remedies for “protection of honor, dignity and 
business reputation (“zashchita chesti, dostoinstva i delovoi reputatsii”), actionable 
only if the offending imputation does not “correspond with reality”;5 and (ii) the 
criminal offense of defamation, in which not only must the offending imputation 
be false but, also, the defendant is required to have made the comment knowing 
it to be so.6 The Russian term used for this second category is “kleveta” (i.e., not 
2  Bonnie Docherty, “Defamation Law: Positive Jurisprudence”, 13 Harvard Human Rights Journal (2000), 
263-287.
3  Richard H. Helmholz, Select Cases on the Law of Defamation to 1600 (Selden Society Vol. 101, London, 
1985), xxx-xxxii; and V.V. Veeder, “A History and Theory of the Law of Defamation” (Part 1), 3 Columbia 
Law Review (1903), 546, at 551. 
4  G. Arapova (ed.), Sbornik praktiki Rossiiskikh sudov po delam o diffamatsii (Tsentr zashchity prav SMI, 
St. Petersburg, 2006), 7-8; and A.M. Erdelevskii, Kompensatsiia moral’nogo vreda (Wolters Kluwer, 
Moscow, 2007, 3rd ed.), 143.
5  1994 RF Civil Code (30 November 1994, with subsequent amendments) No.51-FZ, SZRF (1994) 
No.32 item 3301, Art.152(1), discussed at length below in section 4.2.
6  1996 RF Criminal Code (13 June 1996) No.63-FZ, SZRF (1996) No.25 item 2954, Art.128-1. The 
previous provisions in the Criminal Code, Art.129, were repealed by 2011 RF Federal Law “O vnesenii 
izmenenii v ugolovnyi kodeks RF” (7 December 2011) No.420-FZ, SZRF (2011) No.50 item 7362, 
while Art.128-1 was restored by 2012 RF Federal Law “O vnesenii izmenenii v ugolovnyi kodeks RF” 
(28 July 2012) No.141-FZ, SZRF (2012) No.31 item 4330, as discussed further below in section 4.1.
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“diffamatsiia”);7 but, in keeping with English usage, the term “defamation” is 
used for this criminal wrong as well as for the general concept. Closely related 
is the civil wrong of insult (“oskorblenie”), which compensate affronts to dignity 
even if they are not demonstrably based upon falsehood;8 and there is also an 
administrative offense of insult (likewise “oskorblenie”) which similarly does not 
require remarks to have been factually incorrect but stipulates that they should 
have involved an element of “indecency” (“vyrazhennoe v neprilichnoy forme”).9 
The formal division between libel and slander, by which English law distinguishes 
remedies for spoken and written defamation, is not found in Russian law. Is-
sues relating to the protection of private information10 and image rights11 in the 
modern law are beyond the scope of this article and will not be discussed below.
2. The Pre-Revolutionary Era
The concept of verbal injury as an actionable infringement of honor and status, 
attracting sanctions in the same way as physical blows, is scattered through the 
earliest Russian texts.12 While the role of criminal procedure in addressing such 
wrongs may have been the primary concern of the early texts, the rise of civil 
litigation can be traced to the sixteenth century.13 The Sudebnik of 1550 reveals 
that in cases of infringement of honor (“bezchest’e”) a complex scale of civil 
compensation had evolved, according to the rank and gender of the victim.14 
Such formal distinctions according to status survived the eighteenth-century 
reception of Roman law in Russia15 but receded after emancipation of the serfs in 
7  See definition in A.K. Simonov and M.B. Gorbanevskii (eds.), Poniatiia chesti, dostoinstva i delovoi 
reputatsii (Medeia Publishers, Moscow, 2004), 14-15.
8  1994 RF Civil Code, op.cit. note 5, Art.150. 
9  2001 RF Code on Administrative Offenses (30 December 2001) No.195-FZ, SZRF (2002) No.1 item 
1, Art.5.61(1)-(2), discussed further below at section 4.1. See a definition in Simonov and Gorbanevskii 
op.cit. note 7, 15. This structure parallels that found in other continental European jurisdictions: e.g., 
see the German Strafgesetzbuch, BGBl. I S.3322 (13 November 1998) §§185-200, distinguishing the 
criminal offenses of insult and defamation (“Beleidigung” and “Üble Nachrede”).
10  1994 RF Civil Code, op.cit. note 5, Art.150.
11  Ibid., Art.152-1.
12  See a general account in Nancy Shields Kollmann, By Honor Bound: State and Society in Early Modern 
Russia (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1999), 42-44. The late 14th-century Charter of the Dvina, 
e.g., provided in Art.2 for remedies against those who used insulting language against boyars (for an 
English translation see George Vernadsky, Mediaeval Russian Laws (Columbia University Press, New 
York, NY, 1947), 58). 
13  See Horace W. Dewey, “Old Muscovite Concepts of Injured Honor (Beschestie)”, 27(4) Slavic Review 
(1968), 594-603. 
14  See, also, the Sudebnik of Feodor Ioannovich, available in F.F. Mazurin (ed.), Sudebnik Tsaria Feodora 
Ioannovicha 1589 g. (Tipografiia G. Lissnera i A. Geshelia, Moscow, 1900), Arts.41-71. 
15  See Darrell P. Hammer, “Russia and the Roman Law”, 16 American Slavic and East European Review (1957), 
1-13; and John Quigley, “The Romanist Character of Soviet Law”, in Ferdinand J.M. Feldbrugge (ed.), 
The Emancipation of Soviet Law, in F.J.M. Feldbrugge (ed.), Law in Eastern Europe No.44 (Dordrecht, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 27-50.
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1861. In keeping with other European legal systems, insult and defamation were 
treated primarily as criminal wrongs, but a parallel right to civil compensation 
also arose.16 Tiutriumov’s compilation of the Civil Laws in the latter days of the 
Russian empire allowed for small sums to be claimed by way of civil compensa-
tion, alongside or as an alternative to criminal sanctions, when the claimant had 
suffered “personal disgrace and insult”.17 Pobedonotsev’s authoritative Course on 
Civil Law, published in 1896, drew parallels with the contemporary French and 
German law in casting wrongs against the person as primarily a matter for the 
criminal law, and to that extent the primacy of the detailed civil remedies offered 
by English law was regarded as “distinctive”.18 At the same time, he also traced 
the legacy of the Roman law actio iniuriarum—in Russia as in other European 
legal systems—in providing injured persons, or their relatives, with civil remedies 
in cases of murder, assault, the use of violence, deprivation of freedom as well as 
personal disgrace and insult.19 
However, the highly restrictive system of press censorship which had been 
in place since the enactment of “temporary” press laws in 186520 gave the law 
of defamation a very different context from that which obtained in some other 
European jurisdictions at that time. Admittedly, there appeared to be little sign 
of the widespread use of defamation lawsuits as the tool of political censorship, 
which is said to have been prevalent in late nineteenth-century Germany;21 but 
the scope to defame those in public life, in effect, was cut off at source. There 
was no phenomenon in Russia comparable to the “epidemic” of libel litigation 
observed in Germany in the 1880s involving tens of thousands of cases annually.22 
And there was certainly no Russian equivalent of the French Loi sur la liberté de 
la presse enacted in 1881,23 or of the developments that in England had led to 
16  See, e.g., A. Gozhev and I. Tsvetkov, Sbornik grazhdanskikh zakonov (Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, St. 
Petersburg, 1886) Vol.2, paras. 8853-8861. 
17  “Lichnye obidy i oskorbleniia”. See I.M. Tiutriumov, Zakony grazhdanskie s raz’iasneniiami 
Pravitel’stvuiushchego Senata i kommentariiami Russkikh iuristov, Book Two (Zakonovedenie, St Petersburg, 
1913, 4th ed.), Arts.667-669.
18  K.P. Pobedonotsev, Kurs grazhdanskogo prava (Tret’ia chast’: Dogovory i obiazatel’stva) (Sinodal’naia 
tipografiia, St. Peterburg, 1896), 594. For detailed discussion of the influence of French and German 
codification upon Russian legal development in the nineteenth century, see Tatiana Borisova, “Russian 
National Legal Tradition: Svod versus Ulozhenie in Nineteenth-century Russia”, 33(3) Review of Central 
and East European Law (2008), 295-341, 295.
19  Pobedonotsev, op.cit. note 18, 593.
20  And remained in force being progressively augmented until 1905. For further background, see Daniel 
Balmuth, “Origins of the Russian Press Reform of 1865”, 47 The Slavonic and East European Review 
(1969), 369-388.
21  Ann Goldberg, Honor, Politics, and the Law in Imperial Germany, 1871-1914 (CUP, Cambridge, 2010), 
81-82.
22  Ibid., 4.
23  On the significance of the 1881 legislation in liberalizing the French law of defamation, see Raymond 
Kuhn, The Media in France (Routledge, London, 1995), 50-52.
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the establishment of a fair-comment defense as the newspaper industry expanded 
in the latter part of the nineteenth century.24 In the latter part of the imperial 
period, while the Russian law of defamation lay recognizably within the European 
tradition,25 it remained largely isolated from the changes in press culture that in 
certain European jurisdictions were causing the proper boundaries of freedom 
of speech to be rethought in the closing years of the nineteenth century.26 
3. Defamation and Insult in the Soviet Era
After the Revolution, the crimes of insult27 and defamation28 survived in the 1926 
RSFSR Criminal Code as offenses against public order. Both were directed at 
honor and dignity, with the exacerbating feature in relation to insult that some 
sort of indecency had been imputed. Moreover, while defamation is based on 
false information, an insult might be justiciable even if it was not based upon 
a false statement of fact. However, no specific provision was made in the 1922 
RSFSR Civil Code for civil liability for defamation or insult, or indeed in any 
other legislation of the early Soviet era. As Grzybowski has suggested,29 further 
development of private remedies for slights against reputation was hardly consis-
tent with the post-revolutionary order, certainly insofar as the allegedly defama-
tory remarks appeared in the media. The role of the Soviet press was not only to 
inform on matters of objective truth but, also, to educate its readership and to 
exhort it to greater endeavor. Accordingly, it was “the duty of the Soviet man to 
embrace and emulate the criticism by the press and to assist in the elimination of 
mistakes and shortcomings”.30 Even if the media were on occasion over-zealous 
in exposing personal and organizational failures, individual interests were not be 
asserted in such a way as to undermine the forces of progress. 
24  On English law, see e.g., Ian Loveland, Political Libels: A Comparative Study (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2000) 19-50; and Paul Mitchell, The Making of the Modern Law of Defamation (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2004), 151-163.
25    Indeed, the draft civil code presented to the Duma on the eve of the First World War followed the 
European style of containing a general clause on delictual liability, in Art.1173, without specific provision 
for defamation or insult. The fifth section of the Code, on the Law of Obligations, was introduced to the 
Duma in 1913. For the official publication approved by the Minister of Justice, see V.E. Gertsenberg and 
I.S. Pereterskii (eds.), Obiazatel’stvennoe pravo. Kniga v Grazhdanskogo Ulozheniia (Pravo, St Petersburg, 
1914), the draft introduced on 14 October 1913 to the State Duma. The draft had drawn heavily on 
continental European scholarship; see C.P. Gal’perin, “Zamechaniia na glavu pervuiu proekta v knigi 
grazhdanskogo ulozheniia (ob obiazatel’stvakh)”, Vestnik prava (1903) No.1, 61-104; and Hammer, 
op.cit. note 15, 7-9. 
26    Such as resulted e.g., in France in the enactment of the Loi sur la liberté de la presse du 29 juillet 1881, 
noted supra. For England see Loveland, op.cit. note 24, ch. 2. 
27  1926 RSFSR Criminal Code, SU RSFSR (1926) No.80 item 600, Arts.159 and 160.
28  Ibid., Art.161.
29  Kazimierz Grzybowski, Soviet Legal Institutions (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1962), 
141, referring to the 1922 RSFSR Criminal Code, SU RSFSR (1922) No.15 item 153.
30  Grzybowski, op.cit. note 29.
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The civil law of defamation, therefore, did not figure in Soviet textbooks for 
several decades; but an important turning point, as in so many other respects, was 
the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party in 1956 and Khrushchev’s 
famous “secret” speech. The ensuing public campaign to rediscover “Leninist” 
principles of social democracy and to restructure socialist legality was ultimately 
to replace the “dualism of law and terror” with a new “dualism of law and social 
pressure”.31 Nonetheless, one of its lasting consequences was a reappraisal—at least 
at a theoretical level—of protection for the honor and dignity of the individual. 
The 1961 Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union32 envisaged a 
transition to communism in which “moral principles become increasingly 
important”,33 bringing society closer to a stage in which “the personal dignity of 
each citizen is protected by society”.34 
This new focus upon the importance of personal dignity became apparent 
almost immediately in the more punitive approach adopted by the 1960 RSFSR 
Criminal Code to crimes against the person. In the 1926 Criminal Code, political 
crimes had been punished with significantly greater severity than non-political 
offenses, so that infliction of bodily injury, rape, theft, defamation and insult 
met with relatively lenient penalties as compared with crimes against the state.35 
With the 1960 Code, this approach changed in relation to a range of offenses 
against the person. In particular, Articles 130 and 131 of the 1960 Criminal 
Code doubled the possible terms of imprisonment that could be imposed in 
relation to defamation and insult.36 
Developments in the civil law were also significant. The 1961 USSR 
Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation aspired to establish the legal 
relationships for the new era37 by providing not only for the material and technical 
foundation for communism but, also, “the greater satisfaction of the material 
31  Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR (Harvard UP, Cambridge, MA, 1963, rev. ed.), 88.
32  Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961.
33  Ibid., 108.
34    Ibid., 109-110 (emphasis added). The 1977 USSR Constitution later provided, in Art.57, that citizens 
had “the right to judicial protection against infringements of their honor and dignity, life and health, 
and personal freedom and property”, although this “right” was qualified by the stipulation, in Art.39, 
that “the exercise of rights and citizens by citizens must not harm the interest of society and the state 
or the rights of other citizens”. Ved. SSSR (1977) No.41 item 617. English translations of the 1936 
and 1977 USSR Constitutions are in Ferdinand Feldbrugge (ed.), The Constitutions of the USSR and 
the Union Republics: Analysis, Texts, Reports (Sijthoff & Noordhoff Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
The Netherlands, Germantown, MD, 1979). 
35  See Harold J. Berman and James W. Spindler, Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1972, 2nd ed.), 27.
36  Ved. RSFSR (1960) No.40 item 591. The sentence for defamation was raised to between one and 
three years, as compared with six months to one year under the 1926 Code (Art.130). Similarly, insult 
attracted imprisonment of between six months and one year (Art.131), more than double the terms 
stipulated previously. 1926 RSFSR Criminal Code, op.cit. note 27. 
37  Ved.SSSR (1961) No.50 item 525, Art.1.
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and spiritual needs of the citizen”.38 In particular, a civil remedy was restored to 
the law of defamation. Article 7 offered individuals and also organizations the 
right to demand the refutation of statements that impugned their “honor and 
dignity”.39 If the author of the statement failed to prove its truth, the sanction 
for failure to refute was a fine payable to the state. The principal distinguishing 
feature between civil defamation and criminal defamation was that while the 
criminal offense required malicious intent, the civil wrong was actionable even 
where the defendant had no intention to harm. In the absence of provable intent, 
therefore, the criminal prosecution would fail, but a civil claim might remain. 
Article 7 was thus an important landmark, in effect restoring to the Soviet citizen 
a remedy for iniuria. Admittedly, it did not provide for the moral injury suffered 
to be compensated by the award of damages but, instead, attempted to restore 
reputation, on pain of criminal punishment of the defendant. Article 7 of the 
1961 Fundamentals was duly implemented by Article 7 of the 1964 Civil Code 
of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, in which its text was repeated 
verbatim.40 It was left unclear whether Article 88 of the Fundamentals—the 
“general clause” on delictual liability—allowed for damages to be payable for 
patrimonial loss or moral prejudice. Soviet scholars argued that the former should 
be exigible on proof of fault, but were divided on the latter.41 
The criteria by which defamatory statements were to be judged under Article 
7 are of particular note.42 Other European jurisdictions purport to appraise 
defamatory remarks objectively by hypothesizing the likely impact on the general 
community. Defamation in German law, for example, is perpetrated by remarks 
which “malign [the plaintiff] or disparage him in public opinion”,43 and an English 
court asks: “would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-
thinking members of society generally?”44 Inevitably, therefore, the attribution of 
opinions to “right-thinking” members of society becomes normative, not purely 
descriptive, by reference to what—in the court’s view—persons in the street ought 
38  Ibid., Art.1. For parallel developments in the 1964 Czechoslovak Civil Code, see Theodor Vondracek, 
“Defamation in Czechoslovak Law as a New Legal Concept”, 1 Review of Socialist Law (1975), 281-307.
39  1961 USSR Fundamentals, op.cit. note 37. The first paragraph of Art.7 reads: “Grazhdanin ili organizatsiia 
vprave trebovat’ po sudu oproverzheniia porochashchikh ikh chest’ i dostoinstvo svedenii, esli rasprostranivshii 
takie svedeniia ne dokazhet, chto oni sootvetstvuiut deistvitel’nosti.”
40  1964 RSFSR Civil Code, Ved. RSFSR (1964) No.24 item 406. This provision was similarly incorporated 
into the Civil Codes of the other fourteen Soviet republics during the course of 1963-1964. See Serge 
L. Levitsky, Copyright, Defamation, and Privacy in Soviet Civil Law, in Ferdinand J.M. Feldbrugge (ed.), 
Law in Eastern Europe No.20 (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, Sijthoff & Noordhoff Publishers, 
1979), 145.
41  Levitsky, op.cit. note 40, 18-19. 
42  Ibid., 32-38. For an American perspective, see Peter B. Maggs and Karl F. Winkler, “Libel in the Soviet 
Press: The New Civil Remedy in Theory and Practice”, 41 Tulane Law Review (1966), 55.
43  StGB, op.cit. note 9, §187.
44  (1936) 52 TLR 669; and (1936) 2 All ER, 1237 at 1240.
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to think rather than what they do think. The normative nature of the equivalent 
test in Soviet law was explicit from the outset. Not every negative comment 
would attract liability in terms of Article 7. As with other civil rights, the right 
to honor and dignity merited protection only in so far as consistent with “the 
rules of the socialist community, and the moral principles of a society building 
communism”.45 In a 1964 review of judicial practice, the USSR Supreme Court 
declared that honor and dignity was undermined where the imputation lowered 
the subject in public estimation “from the point of view of the laws and rules of 
socialist communal life and of the moral principles of our society”.46 Of course, 
many of the types of imputation deemed actionable by this standard would also 
have been regarded as defamatory by Western European standards—such as 
allegations of dishonesty or criminal or disorderly conduct. But, in addition, they 
included other categories more particularly reflecting Soviet mores, for example: 
assertions regarding non-fulfillment of labor obligations, violation of civic or filial 
duties or of the rules of communal living, display of characteristics disapproved 
of by communist morality, or membership in a religious sect.47 
The initial reception of Article 7 was “troubled”, with leading newspapers 
such as Izvestiia and Pravda campaigning forcefully against recourse to the new 
provisions being offered as a means of vindication for “intriguers” (“kliauzniki”) 
and “parasites” (“parazity”).48 Nonetheless, Article 7 remained, and while it could 
hardly be said to have opened the floodgates to defamation litigation generally—
whether generally or in relation to political comment—its impact was not trivial. 
By 1972, the Plenum of the Supreme Court noted that around 400 cases per year 
were being brought across the Soviet Union, 75% against newspapers and 25% 
against individuals, and the claims were upheld in just under 50%.49 However, 
a worrying feature of these developments—perhaps reflecting the courts’ lack 
of familiarity with the framework entrusted to them—were the “mistakes” and 
misconceptions that bedeviled legal practice in this area, with significant “errors” 
found in a number of decisions.50 
Protection for reputation was thus significantly enhanced in the 1960s; 
and, indeed, the right to protection of honor and dignity was included in the 
1977 Soviet Constitution.51 But while it was said that Article 7 had enhanced 
45  1961 USSR Fundamentals, op.cit. note 37, Art.5. 
46  Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost’ (1964) No.12, 17 at 18.
47  Levitsky, op.cit. note 40, 38-42.
48  For discussion, see Fred H. Cate, “Civil Defamation Law in the Soviet Union”, 23 Stanford Journal of 
International Law (1987), 304-308.
49    Biulleten’ Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR (1972) No.1, 3 at 4. See, also, Levitsky, op.cit. note 40, 5.
50  Biulleten’ Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR (1972) No.1, 3 at 4.
51  1977 USSR Constitution, op.cit. note 34, Art.57.
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the status of the press in making it more accountable,52 there was no equivalent 
re-evaluation of the extent to which freedom of expression should be taken 
into account when defamation was alleged. Article 125 of the 1936 Soviet 
Constitution had guaranteed freedom of expression “in accordance with the 
interests of the workers and the goals of strengthening the socialist order”, but 
this sat awkwardly with some of the other features of the new 1960 RSFSR 
Criminal Code, most notably the retention and strengthening of earlier provisions 
on counter-revolutionary crimes, already defined in exceedingly broad terms in 
the 1926 Code.53 Article 70 of the 1960 Criminal Code—found in the section 
entitled “Especially Dangerous Crimes against the State”—criminalized anti-
Soviet agitation and propaganda,54 penalizing:
“Agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or weakening Soviet 
regime or of committing particular, especially dangerous crimes against the state, or the 
circulation for the same purpose of defamatory fabrications which defame the Soviet state 
and social system, or the circulation or preparation or keeping, for the same purpose, of 
literature of such content […].”55 
Indeed, it was under these provisions that the writers Siniavskii and Daniel 
were prosecuted and imprisoned in 1966, despite the allegedly defamatory 
propaganda having taken the form of works of fiction.56 Notwithstanding in-
ternational condemnation of the trial proceedings, Article 190-1 was inserted 
into the Criminal Code immediately thereafter.57 This broadened the scope of 
the anti-Soviet propaganda offense by extending it to “fabrications” known to 
be false which “defamed” the Soviet state and social system, even if they were not 
circulated for the purpose of subverting or weakening Soviet authority. There 
was no requirement that anti-Soviet intent be proven. 
The scope for political discussion was thus limited by not only by press 
censorship but, also, by broadly-framed provisions criminalizing any comment 
on public affairs that could be construed as defamation of the state. Accordingly, 
52  A.V. Beliavskii and N.A. Pridvorov, Okhrana chesti i dostoinstva lichnosti v SSSR (Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 
Moscow, 1971) 27.
53  See, in particular, Art.59 of the 1926 RSFSR Criminal Code, op.cit. note 27. For an English translation 
of the 1936 USSR Constitution see Feldbrugge, op.cit. note 34. 
54    For examples of prosecutions under the 1960 RSFSR Criminal Code (Arts.70 and 190-1), see Amnesty 
International, Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR (AI Publications, London, 1980), 9-19, available at 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR46/004/1980/en>. 
55  1960 RSFSR Criminal Code, op.cit. note 36; translation from Berman and Spindler, op.cit. note 35, 
153. 
56  For a full account see Max Hayward (ed.), On Trial: The Soviet State versus “Abram Tertz” and “Nikolai 
Arzhak” (Harper and Row, New York, NY, 1966).
57  Decree of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet (16 September 1966), Ved. RSFSR (1966) 
No.38 item 1038. Arts.190-2 and 190-3—inserted at the same time—dealt with desecration of a state 
emblem and violation of state order by a group (various demonstrations had taken place at the time of 
the trial). 
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there was little call to bring journalists to account in the civil courts for publishing 
politically controversial material, since such text was unlikely to find its way into 
the media in the first place. A well-publicized but relatively rare example, involving 
foreign journalists, was the 1978 case of Gosteleradio v. Whitney and Piper. 
Whitney and Piper were correspondents for The New York Times and Baltimore 
Sun, respectively, who published articles alleging that that the televised confession 
of a prominent Georgian dissident had been fabricated. After highly-charged 
proceedings, at which the dissident in question was brought out of jail to testify, 
the civil action brought against them by the Gosteleradio, the state broadcasting 
organization, was successful, although western commentators regarded the 
proceedings as flawed even by the letter of Soviet law.58 The defendants declined 
to attend the proceedings and, in any event, had no standing to compel their 
newspapers to refute their statements; in the event, however, they did pay the 
fine exacted by the Soviet court. 
The perestroika era saw further development of civil remedies for defamation, 
however. In the closing months of the Soviet Union, the 1961 Fundamental 
Principles of Civil Legislation were recast into the 1991 Fundamental Principles 
of Civil Legislation which significantly expanded the provisions relevant to 
defamation. Article 7 of the 1961 Fundamentals had dealt with infringements of 
honor and dignity by compelling refutation of the offending statement. Article 
7 of the 1991 Fundamentals protected not only honor and dignity but, also, the 
business reputation of citizens and juridical persons.59 A further highly significant 
change was that the 1991 Fundamentals provided for monetary compensation for 
damage and moral harm,60 over and above the right to demand refutation of the 
defamatory imputation. Nonetheless, in this era of glasnost’, a notable omission 
from the 1991 text of Article 7 was any reference to freedom of expression, to 
counterbalance the extended reach of defamation. 
By the end of the Soviet era, therefore, the civil law of defamation had 
been revitalized but in isolation from the processes which in other European 
jurisdictions had created a complex balance between protection for reputation 
on the one hand and press independence and freedom of expression on the other. 
In the 1990s, the lifting of control of the media brought a flowering of political 
commentary and a new generation of journalists. Privatized and independent 
58  See Glenn Kolleeny, “Comment: The Soviet Law of Defamation and the Case of Gosteleradio v. Whitney 
and Piper”, 20 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1981), 295-318. Levitsky provides more a 
“unusual” example of a case brought under Art.7 (op.cit. note 40, 54-57) in which defamation proceedings 
had been instituted (unsuccessfully) by a district prosecutor, G. Filimonov, against a commentator, O. 
Chaikovskaia. The allegedly defamatory allegation was contained in her article published in Izvestiia 
describing his views as “naïve” and “dangerous” after he had written to Literaturnaia Gazeta arguing 
for a presumption of guilt in criminal proceedings. 
59  1961 Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics, op.cit. note 
37, Art.7(1).
60  Ibid., Art.7(6).
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media organizations competed in Russia to produce original discussion and 
satire that was often highly critical of public and political figures. With the turn 
of the new century, however, independent media organizations have struggled 
to continue and political satire has shifted from the traditional media to the 
internet.61 Of course, many factors have combined to change the environment for 
political speech in the twenty-first century Russia—most of which are beyond the 
scope of this article, not least of which are the “voluntary” cooperation between 
journalists and the state62 and tighter control over access to information.63 The 
role of the law of defamation in “chilling” debate in the traditional media should 
not be ignored, however.
4. Defamation in the Post-Soviet Era
The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation makes provision both for the 
importance of reputation to the individual and for freedom of expression. Article 
23 enshrines the right to protect honor and good name, but is balanced by Article 
29(1), guaranteeing “freedom of thought and expression” and “freedom of the 
mass media”, and adding that “censorship is forbidden”.64 Article 46 confers a 
general right to judicial protection for constitutional rights and freedoms. 
4.1. Decriminalization and Recriminalization of Defamation
Although in 2010, the United Nations described criminal defamation laws gener-
ally as “problematical”,65 laws criminalizing defamation and insult continue to be 
common, notably in continental European jurisdictions—even if rarely applied.66 
61  See Konstantin Ivanov, “Protection of Speech Criticizing the Government: A Comparative Analysis 
of Legislation and Jurisprudence of the Russian Federation, the USA and the ECtHR”, LLM thesis, 
Central European University, 2008 (available at <http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2008/ivanov_konstantin.
pdf>).
62  See Dorothea Schönfeld, “Tilting at Windmills? The European Response to Violations of Media Freedom 
in Russia”, 37(2-3) Review of Central and East European Law (2012), 233-290, at 279.
63  On the restrictions on access to information and the “broad denominator of confidential information” 
that has replaced “references to political and ideological control”, see Hedwig de Smaele, “Mass Media 
and the Information Climate in Russia”, 59 Europe-Asia Studies (2007), 1299-1313, at 1310.
64  1993 RF Constitution, Rossiiskaia gazeta (25 December 1993), Art.29(5).
65  UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Addendum, Tenth Anniversary Joint 
Declaration: Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade, AHRC/14/23/Add.2, (2010) 
Annex para. 2.
66  E.g., in France “diffamation publique” attracts sanctions in terms of Art.29 of the Loi sur la liberté de 
la presse du 29 juillet 1881 and Art.R621-1 of the Code penal, whereas “diffamation non publique” 
is dealt with by Art.R621-2 of the Code Pénal (both texts available in full at French Government 
website <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/>). In Germany, the crimes of defamation and insult are set 
out in §§185-200 of the Strafgesetzbuch (op.cit. note 9). In England, on the other hand, the common 
law offenses of sedition and seditious libel, defamatory libel and obscene libel were abolished by the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s.73 (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 2009 chapter 25, and 
also available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/>). 
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In post-Soviet Russia too, defamation and insult remained crimes until 2011, 
attracting fines or imprisonment, with more severe penalties imposed in cases 
where the offending statement was published in the media or where it contained 
a false allegation of criminal conduct;67 in practice, accusations that a person has 
committed a crime were most often the basis for prosecutions. Since a successful 
prosecution required malicious intent to be established as well as knowledge that 
the allegation was indeed false, convictions were relatively rare;68 but a number of 
high profile cases had generated controversy as to the appropriateness of criminal 
sanctions in such matters. One of the most notorious involved the investigative 
journalist Mikhail Beketov, who had published articles critical of the mayor of 
the Khimki district outside Moscow, Vladimir Strelchenko. When Beketov’s 
car was burnt out in 2007, he alleged that Strelchenko was responsible for the 
incident. Criminal proceedings were brought under Article 129 but interrupted 
by a near-fatal attack on Beketov by unidentified assailants. They resumed in 
2010 with the defendant in a wheelchair and having lost the power of speech. A 
guilty verdict and fine of 5000 rubles at first instance, triggering significant public 
sympathy, was eventually overturned on appeal, on the basis that the necessary 
criminal intent had not been established by the prosecution.69 
Following these developments, Articles 129 and 130, setting out the crimes of 
defamation (“kleveta”) and insult (“oskorblenie”), were deleted from the Criminal 
Code in November 2011.70 However, they did not disappear altogether; in effect, 
they were reincarnated as the administrative offenses of defamation and insult 
in Articles 5.60 and 5.61 of the 2001 RF Code of Administrative Offenses,71 
and indeed even higher fines were imposed than under the repealed criminal 
provisions. The re-categorization of these offenses perhaps carried some symbolic 
significance therefore;72 but it was of marginal impact in liberalizing the law in 
practice. 
67  1996 RF Criminal Code, op.cit. note 6, Arts.129 and 130.
68  See overview by N. Alexandrovna et al. in “Russian Federation”, in C. Glasser Jr. (ed.), International 
Libel and Privacy Handbook (Bloomberg Press, New York, NY, 2nd ed. 2009), 354-376, at 356-357.
69    Khimki Town Court (10 November 2010) Case No.263. See, also, the prosecution (noted at note 190 
below) of Oleg Orlov, Chair of the Memorial Human Rights Society, who had accused President Kadyrov 
of Chechnia of complicity in the murder of a journalist. Orlov was acquitted by Khamovniki District 
Court, Moscow City (14 June 2011). A criminal prosecution brought against the blogger Alexander 
Sorkin, accusing him of defaming the governor of the Khemerovo region in a posting that compared 
Russian regional governors to Latin American dictators, drew international attention and was dropped 
when the 2011 changes to the Criminal Code were enacted. 
70  2011 RF Federal Law No.420-FZ, op.cit. note 6.
71  As inserted by 2011 RF Federal Law No.420-FZ, ibid. 
72  Not least because the stated scope of administrative offenses is to regulate conduct compromising public 
order, public safety and the environment: 2001 RF Code on Administrative Offenses, op.cit. note 9, 
Art.1.2.
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In any event, any intended concession towards a more liberal regime was 
abruptly withdrawn after only a few months by reform in July 2012, reinstating 
defamation to the Criminal Code.73 Article 128.1—as now inserted into the 
Code74—has not restored prison sentences but has introduced penalties for 
defamation that significantly exceed those exacted under Article 129 or under 
the short-lived Article 5.60 of the Administrative Code. In the ordinary case, 
defamation is punished with a maximum fine of 500,000 rubles or the equivalent 
of the defendant’s income for a six-month period, or 160 hours of compulsory 
labor;75 where the offending imputation is contained in a public statement, 
publicly performed work, or in the media, the maximum fine increases to 
1,000,000 rubles.76 This tariff rises to 2,000,000 rubles where the defamation 
has been pronounced by the defendant in an official capacity,77 3,000,000 rubles 
where its substance was that the victim was suffering from a noxious disease or 
had committed sexual offense78 and 5,000,000 rubles where it alleged the victim 
to have committed a serious crime.79 There is also separate provision imposing a 
fine of up to 2,000,000 rubles in relation to defamation of those involved in legal 
process, judges, jurors, prosecutors, and others involved in judicial procedure.80 
Article 128(1) defines defamation (“kleveta”) as “the dissemination of 
information known to be false impugning the honor and dignity of another 
person or damaging his reputation”.81 The important distinction from the civil 
wrong, therefore, is that while civil liability does not turn upon malicious intent 
(as discussed further below), the criminal offense requires that the defendant 
should have known the imputation to be unfounded (the adverb used in the 
Russian text is “zavedomo”). No further indication is given as to the precise state of 
knowledge required to found liability, nor the circumstances in which knowledge 
might be inferred; but, as with Article 129 previously, establishing proof of such 
knowledge may turn out to be a significant barrier to successful prosecutions.82 
73  2012 Federal Law No.141-FZ, op.cit. note 6.
74  The Russian-language text of the new Art.128.1 is available at <http://www.pravo.gov.ru/>, or at the 
commercial databases, “Garant” (<http://www.garant.ru/>), “KonsultantPlius” (<http://www.consultant.
ru/>), or “Kodeks” (<http://www.kodeks.ru/>).
75  2011 Federal Law No.420-FZ, op.cit. note 6, Art.128.1.1. 
76  Ibid., Art.128.1.2.
77  Ibid., Art.128.1.3.
78  Ibid., Art.128.1.4.
79  Ibid., Art.128.1.5.
80  This offense is now contained in Art.298(1) of the Criminal Code, op.cit. note 6. 
81  2011 Federal Law No.420-FZ, op.cit. note 6, Art.128.1.1. 
82  On the statistics for the years 2009-2011, see Aleksei Nikol’skii, “Verkhovnyi sud’ia: za klevetu 
prigovarivaiut redko”, in Vedomosti (19 July 2012), available at <http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/
news/2299026/verhovnyj_sudya_za_klevetu_prigovarivayut_redko>.
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The “administrative” offense of insult, introduced in 2011, remains and 
is constituted by “debasing the honor and dignity of another person, expressed 
in an indecent form”.83 There is little sign, as yet, of widespread prosecutions 
on such charges; but an indication of the potential scope of criminal liability in 
relation to remarks that are demonstrably true is found in the civil proceedings 
forming the basis for the 2007 case of Chemodurov v. Russia.84 In that case, a 
journalist had published an expose describing the misappropriation of funds from 
a regional Governor’s budget and the Governor’s instructions to officials to cover 
this up. He had reflected that “a Governor who gives such advice is abnormal”.85 
A claim brought by the Governor for defamation under Civil Code Article 152 
was unsuccessful on the basis that the journalist could prove the factual basis for 
the story. However, the court awarded damages for the insult suffered, in terms 
of Article 150, because of the use of the term “abnormal” (“nenormal’nyi”) was 
an affront to dignity that, in colloquial usage, could carry connotations of mental 
incapacity. On the journalist’s application to Strasbourg, the ECtHR found the 
comment not to have exceeded the acceptable limits of criticism. Nonetheless, the 
case serves as a warning that, even where journalists have verified their sources, 
comment thereon using figurative or ambiguous terminology may be vulnerable 
to interpretation as “indecent” and, thus, actionable by civil or criminal suit. 
There is a further administrative offense of omitting to take measures to 
prevent insult in a public forum or the media, even if the instigators were third 
parties,86 although there is no indication of the circumstances in which such 
failure to take action attracts liability, nor those by which such failure might be 
exculpated. Moreover, Article 319 of the Criminal Code remains: insult specifically 
directed against public officials is an offense punishable by a fine and/or by a 
period of compulsory labor. 
The re-criminalization of defamation so soon into a new Presidency87 is no 
doubt intended to be taken as warning of a more punitive approach towards 
unguarded public discourse. It remains to be seen whether, in practice, it heralds 
a fresh wave of successful criminal prosecutions. Nonetheless, this renewed threat 
of prosecution and of significant financial and other penalties has the potential 
to exert a persuasive form of negative censorship. Its effects are likely to be felt 
83  2001 RF Code on Administrative Offenses, op.cit. note 9, Art.5.61(1),(2) (“unizhenie chesti i dostoinstva 
drugogo litsa, vyrazhennoe v neprilichnoi forme”).
84    Chemodurov v. Russia (31 July 2007) No.72683/01, (2008) 47 EHRR 9. The full documentation for this 
case, including the decisions of the lower courts, is available at <http://www.mmdc.narod.ru/caselaw/
process_19.html>. 
85   The offending sentences read in full: “I do not know what others think, but my view is as follows: a 
Governor who gives such advice is abnormal. Let me clarify, lest I face judicial proceedings: I am talking 
about the conduct of a [state] official, not Mr. Rutskoy’s personality, which is none of my business.” 
(English translation in version presented to ECtHR, op.cit. note 84.)
86  2001 RF Code on Administrative Offenses, op.cit. note 9, Art.5.61(3).
87  President Putin took his oath of office on 7 May 2012.
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not so much within the conventional media but, to a greater extent, by small-
scale media organizations and individuals voicing public comment by informal 
means—a blogger who gets the facts wrong in alleging criminal wrongdoing by 
a public official, for instance, risks not only prosecution but, also, bankruptcy. 
4.2. Civil Liability
Whatever the future impact of recent reforms on the number of criminal and 
administrative prosecutions, the volume of civil litigation continues to be sub-
stantial. Article 150 of the RF Civil Code88 now sets out the general framework 
of protection for “nonmaterial assets” (“nematerial’nye blaga”), including life and 
health, honor, good name, and reputation, privacy, confidentiality, freedom of 
movement, and the rights of authors. More specifically, Article 152 deals with 
“honor, dignity and business reputation”,89 reworking the provisions formerly 
located in Article 7 of the 1991 Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation. A 
party who believes himself, herself, or itself to have been defamed: 
“[…] has the right to apply through the court for refutation of information, impugning his 
honor, dignity or business reputation, unless the person who has spread such information 
proves its correspondence with reality.” 90
Essentially, therefore, Article 152 offers a remedy where: (i) the plaintiff can 
establish that the offending statement or publication have a damaging effect 
on honor, dignity or business reputation; and (ii) the defendant is unable to 
demonstrate the accuracy of its underlying factual basis. 
On pain of a fine, a “refutation” (“oproverzhenie”) must appear in the same 
medium in which the defamatory material was published, and any documents 
containing the offending words are subject to exchange or recall.91 In cases where 
the offending information has become “widely known and it is not possible to 
bring a refutation to the attention of all”, the plaintiff instead can demand the 
confiscation and destruction of all material in which it is contained. Moreover, 
if the offending imputation has appeared on the Internet, the person responsible 
must publish the refutation by a means which will ensure that it reaches Internet 
88  The RF Civil Code (op.cit. note 5) has been enacted in four parts, between 1995 and 2008. Arts.150-
152 were contained in the first part, which entered into force on 1 January 1995. It has been translated 
in several publications; one is Alexei N. Zhiltsov and Peter B. Maggs (transl.), Civil Code of the Russian 
Federation (English and Russian editions) (Infotropic Media, Moscow, 2010, 2nd rev. ed.).
89  The Russian-language text of Art.152 is available in electronic form in the sources detailed at note 74 
supra.
90  1994 RF Civil Code, op.cit. note 5, Art.152(1). These provisions are available not only to natural 
persons. They extend to protection of the reputation of the dead, Art.152 (1), and also legal persons 
in relation to their business reputations, Art.152(7). The 2002 RF Arbitrazh Procedural Code (24 July 
2002) No.96-FZ, SZRF (2002) No.30 item 3012, Art.33(5), confers jurisdiction on the Arbitrazh 
(Commercial) courts to hear cases brought by business entities concerning injuries to business reputation.
91  1994 RF Civil Code, op.cit. note 5, Art.152(2).
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users.92 The plaintiff also is entitled to respond by publishing a response in the 
same medium.93 A fine is payable in the event that the defendant does not 
comply with the obligations noted above; in addition, the plaintiff may claim 
financial compensation for any losses and moral harm suffered.94 Compensation 
for moral harm may be awarded “regardless of fault”,95 although in fixing the 
quantum the court is directed to consider not only the injury suffered by the 
plaintiff and the plaintiff’s individual characteristics but, also, the degree of “fault” 
(“vina”) exhibited by the defendants,96 subject always to “the requirements of 
reasonableness and justice” (“trebovaniia razumnosti i spravedlivosti”).97 
These provisions are available not only to natural persons. As in other Eu-
ropean Civil Law jurisdictions,98 they extend to protecting the reputation of the 
dead.99 They are also declared expressly in Article 152(8) to apply also to legal 
persons seeking to vindicate their business reputations, whether by demanding a 
refutation, confiscation of material, or by the award of damages.100 Indeed, they 
have been successfully invoked not only by business entities but, also, by public 
organizations such as political parties.101 
Liability is “strict” in the sense that the civil wrong has become uncoupled 
from the concept of intent that is required for the criminal offense and that was 
an element of the actio iniuriarum.102 There is no requirement for the plaintiff 
to prove intention to harm or knowledge of falsity on the defendant’s part. By 
the same token, there is no defense if malice is demonstrably absent, even in the 
circumstances that command “privilege” in Anglo-American jurisdictions. The 
motivation of the defendant is irrelevant except to the extent that perceived degree 
92  These provisions were added to Art.152(2) by amendment in 2012: see note 88 supra.
93  1994 RF Civil Code, op.cit. note 5, Art.152(3).
94  Ibid., Art.152(5).
95  Ibid., Art.1100.
96  Ibid., Art.151(2). See note 103 infra.
97  Ibid., Art.1101(2). 
98  For a comparative discussion see Christian von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts, Vol.2 (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2000), para. 116.
99  1994 RF Civil Code, op.cit. note 5, Art.152(1).
100  The 2002 RF Arbitrazh Procedural Code, op.cit. note 90, Art.33(5), confers jurisdiction on Russian 
arbitrazh (commercial) courts to hear cases brought by business entities concerning injuries to business 
reputation. On the anomalies of awarding moral damages to legal persons, see Erdelevskii, op.cit. note 
4, 119-124.
101  E.g., Suturin v. Pranitskii, Chernovskii District Court, (Zabaikal Region) Chita (13 April 2012) Case 
No.2-613/2012 (plaintiff was a branch of the Communist Party).
102  See Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations (Juta, Cape Town, 1990), 1067ff.
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of fault is one of the circumstances that may affect the amount of compensation 
awarded.103 
Truth is, in effect, a defense in that Article 152(1) allows claims to 
succeed, only if the defendant cannot establish that the defamatory imputation 
“corresponded with reality”. However, the Civil Code makes no express provision 
conferring privileged status on the media in relation to their coverage of matters 
of public interest. The wording of Article 152 makes no mention of a “public 
interest” defense or its equivalent, and it is not sufficiently open-textured to 
accommodate such a defense by implication (by use of concepts such as “fault” or 
“negligence”). An opportunity to adjust the wording of Article 152 was presented 
in 2012, following a major revision project which lasted four years and culminated 
in amendments to 500 of the Civil Code’s Articles.104 However, the focus of 
this exercise primarily has been on commercial, land and intellectual property 
law. Although minor amendments were made to Article 152—with regard, for 
example, to Internet publication105—no public interest defense appears to have 
been contemplated, at least at this time. 
Admittedly, the 1991 RF Law on the Mass Information Media106 sets out a 
number of rights guaranteed to the journalist carrying out professional activities, 
including the right to “seek out, inquire, receive and spread information”107 and 
to protect her or his own “honor, dignity, health, life and property as a person 
discharging his civil duty”.108 Otherwise, however, the Law on the Mass Infor-
mation Media reinforces the obligation imposed in the Civil Code to refrain 
from publishing defamatory material. It does not provide any specific defenses 
available in the event of a defamation suit to journalists seeking to exercise these 
rights, except to the extent that journalists are absolved of civil liability where 
they have merely disseminated information obtained from official reports or news 
agencies or from official publications of state organs, public associations etc.109 
103    The text of Art.151 directs that: “In fixing compensation for moral harm, the court takes into account 
the level of culpability of the defendant and any other circumstances worthy of attention. The court 
must also consider any degree of physical and moral suffering that is linked to the victim’s individual 
characteristics.” (“Pri opredelenii razmerov kompensatsii moral’nogo vreda sud prinimaet vo vnimanie 
stepen’ viny narushitelia i inye zasluzhivaiushchie vnimaniia obstoiatel’stva. Sud dolzhen takzhe uchityvat’ 
stepen’ fizicheskikh i nravstvennykh stradanii sviazannykh s individual’nymi osobennostiami litsa, kotoromu 
prichinen vred.”) 
104  See note 88 supra.
105  1994 RF Civil Code, op.cit. note 5, Art.152(2).
106  1991 RF Law “О sredstvakh massovoi informatsii” (27 December 1991) No.2124-1, Ved.RSFSR (1992) 
No.7 item 300.
107  Ibid., Art.47.
108  Ibid., Art.49.
109  Ibid., Art.57.
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4.2.1. The European Convention on Human Rights: Practice Prior to 2005
In the 1990s, one commentator at least had urged that a necessary “first step” 
towards achieving appropriate levels of protection for both reputation and freedom 
of expression would be to recognize that “the relevant texts do not categorically 
exclude recognition of constitutional and international norms as sources of 
defamation law”.110 Some orientation in this direction was suggested by a 1996 
RF Supreme Court decree reminding the judiciary of the central significance 
of Article 18 of the RF 1993 Constitution and highlighting that human rights 
and freedoms were “directly” enforceable and “determinative of the meaning, 
content and application of laws”, although admittedly that document made no 
specific reference to defamation.111 However, those important first steps appeared 
to have been taken when Russia acceded to the Council of Europe a few months 
later in 1996112 and then, in 1998, ratified the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, acknowledging the competence of the European Commission for 
Human Rights to receive applications from Russian citizens and accepting the 
jurisdiction of the European Court.113 
At the same time, serious concern was expressed about Russia’s preparedness 
to join the Council of Europe.114 Optimism that reform processes might 
nonetheless be hastened thereby was not borne out when, in 2005, the Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly presented its wide-ranging report on Honouring 
110  Peter Krug, “Civil Defamation Law and the Press in Russia: Private and Public Interests, the 1995 
Civil Code, and the Constitution” (Part One), 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. (1994-1995), 847-880, at 
860-863.
111  Decree of the Plenum of the RF Supreme Court (31 October 1995) No.8, full text available at Supreme 
Court Website <http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=938>, “O nekotorykh voprosakh 
primeneniia sudami Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii pri osushchestvlenii pravosudiia”, para. 1. 
The document further referred in para. 5 to Art.15(4) of the Constitution, which incorporated the 
“generally recognized principles and norms of international law” (“obshchepriznannye printsipy i normy 
mezhdunarodnogo prava”) as an integral part of the Russian system of justice, and specifically mentioned 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (providing not only for protection of honor and reputation 
at Art.12 but, also, for the right to freedom of opinion and expression at Art.19).
112  As approved by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (see “Invitation to the Russian 
Federation to become a member of the Council of Europe”, Resolution (96)2, Doc. 7490 (14 
February 1996), Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 8 February 1996 at the 557th meeting 
of the Ministers’ Deputies, and available at <http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.
asp?FileID=7424&Language=EN>).
113  1998 RF Federal Law “O ratifikatsii Konventsii o zashchite prav chelovek i osnovnykh svobod i Protokol 
k nei” (30 March 1998) No.54, SZRF (1998) No.14 item 1514, acknowledged: 
 “the jurisdiction of the European Court for Human Rights as binding in regard to questions of 
interpretation and application of the Convention and Protocols thereto in cases of alleged violation 
by the Russian Federation. […]” 
 Although certain derogations were set out with regard to pre-trial and extra-judicial detention, none 
related to freedom of speech or protection of reputation.
114    See Mark Janis, “Russia and the ‘Legality’ of Strasbourg Law”, 8 European Journal of International Law 
(1997), 93-99, at 98; and Bill Bowring, “Russia’s Accession to the Council of Europe and Human 
Rights: Compliance or Cross-purposes?”, 6 European Human Rights Law Review (1997), 628-643.
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of Obligations and Commitments by the Russian Federation.115 The law of defamation 
was identified as one of the areas which fell short of the necessary European 
human rights standards. The rapporteurs noted their concern at “the current 
defamation legislation and its application by the Russian judiciary and executive 
powers. Journalists are often prosecuted through libel suits (approximately 
8,000 to 10,000 lawsuits a year)”.116 By this time also, the growing numbers of 
applications brought by journalists to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR)117 indicated worrying gaps between Russian jurisprudence and European 
standards, and that as far as Russia was concerned the inconsistencies in judicial 
practice first observed by the USSR Supreme Court in the 1970s118 plainly had 
not been alleviated by the requirement to factor in consideration of European 
jurisprudence. The mismatch between the expectations of the CoE’s Parliamentary 
Assembly and Russian defamation law in practice was not perhaps surprising; in 
any event, Russia is hardly alone in having struggled to map the open-textured 
norms of the Convention on to the framework of private law.119 Although the 
Constitution had hitherto addressed protection for both reputation120 and 
freedom of expression,121 there had been little sustained attempt to correlate 
these constitutional norms with civil law remedies.
It is nonetheless possible to draw from Strasbourg jurisprudence certain 
irreducible principles which underlie the balancing of freedom of expression, as 
protected by Article 10 ECHR, against protection for reputation, as part of the 
individual’s “personal identity and psychological integrity” 122 and thus within the 
scope of “private life” under Article 8 ECHR.123 At the risk of over-simplification, 
115    Doc. No.10568 (3 June 2005) available at <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/
WorkingDocs/Doc05/EDOC10568.htm>.
116  Ibid., para. 389. This figure related to the number of civil suits, although disquiet was also noted in 
relation to the growing number of criminal prosecutions. 
117  Including Chemodurov v. Russia, op.cit. note 84; Grinberg v. Russia (21 July 2005) No.23472/03, 43 
EHRR 45; and Dyundin v. Russia (14 October 2008) No.37406/03, 52 EHRR 31. 
118   See the text at note 50 supra. 
119  E.g., English law has found it necessary to recast its rules on “qualified privilege” to provide an ECHR-
compliant public interest defense for responsible journalism (Reynolds v. Times Newspapers (2001) 2 AC 
127), and on the difficulties in translating protection of private life, as entailed in Art.8, into a domestic 
law which did not recognize the tort of breach of privacy. See Wainwright v. UK (26 September 2006) 
No.12350/04, 44 EHRR 40. 
120  1993 RF Constitution, op.cit. note 64, Art.23. 
121  Ibid., Art.29.
122  Pfeifer v. Austria (15 November 2007) No.12556/03, 48 EHRR 8, para. 35.
123  For a discussion of whether protection for reputation is an independent right within the scope of Art.8 
or whether this is more properly to be regarded as a factor to be considered in determining whether 
restrictions upon freedom of expression are lawful in terms of Art.10(2), see Karakó v. Hungary (28 
April 2009) No.39311/05, 52 EHRR 36. On both views, however, the right to reputation must be 
balanced against the right to freedom of expression. On the interaction of Arts.8 and 10, see further 
Lord Lester of Herne Hill et al. (eds.), Human Rights Law and Practice (LexisNexis, London, 2009, 3rd 
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they can be summarized as follows. First of all, where there is a conflict between 
two rights under Articles 8 and 10, both must be considered and “neither of 
them can neutralize the other through the adoption of any absolute approach”.124 
In other words, a test of proportionality is required.125 Nonetheless, the wording 
of Article 10(2)126 requires initially that freedom of speech should be restricted 
only insofar as “prescribed by law”, “necessary in a democratic society” and 
required to meet a legitimate aim.127 Secondly, the press plays a crucial role in 
imparting information and ideas on matters of public interest and the public has 
a right to receive such material. A degree of “exaggeration or even provocation” 
is permitted128 but carries with it the obligation of reporting “in good faith 
in order to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the 
ethics of journalism”.129 Thirdly, although in the first place it is for the national 
courts to make the distinction,130 statements of fact and value judgments must 
be distinguished: “the requirement to prove the truth of a value judgment is 
impossible to fulfill and infringes freedom of opinion itself, which is a fundamental 
ed.) paras. 4.10.37-4.10.38; and see, e.g., the opening analysis in the recent English Supreme Court 
case on defamation by the media, Flood v. Times (2012) 2 WLR 760 per Lord Phillips at para. 44: 
 “The [...] importance [of freedom of speech] has been repeatedly emphasised by the ECtHR when 
considering Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. There is, however, a conflict between Article 10 and Article 8, and the Strasbourg court 
has recently recognized that reputation falls within the ambit of the protection afforded by Article 
8: see Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania (2004) 41 EHRR 200 (GC) at para 91 and Pfeifer v. Austria 
(2007) 48 EHRR 175, paras 33, 35 […] It is indeed [a balancing operation]. The importance of the 
public interest in receiving the relevant information has to be weighed against the public interest 
in preventing the dissemination of defamatory allegations, with the injury that this causes to the 
reputation of the person defamed.” 
124  Lindon v. France (22 October 2007) No.21279/02 and No.36448/02, 46 EHRR 35, Concurring Opinion 
of Judge Loucaides, para. O-I9.
125  Sorguç v. Turkey (unreported) (23 June 2009) No.17089/03, para. 28.
126  “Art.10.1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises. 
 Art.10.2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or 
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” 
 (The text of the authentic English version of the ECHR is available at <http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/
rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/Convention_ENG.pdf>.) 
127  See Observer v. UK (26 November 1991) No.13585/88, 14 EHRR 153, para. 59: “Freedom of expression, 
as enshrined in Art.10, is subject to a number of exceptions which, however, must be narrowly interpreted 
and the necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly established.”
128  Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria (26 April 1995) No.A/313, 21 EHRR 1, para 38.
129  Cumpănă v. Romania (17 December 2004) No.33348/96, 41 EHRR 14, para. 102.
130  Petrenco v. Moldova (30 March 2010) No.20928/05, [2011] EMLR 5, para. 56.
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part of the right secured by Article 10”.131 Finally, the extent to which the disputed 
material relates to a matter of public interest is highly significant. The limits of 
acceptable criticism are wider in relation to persons acting in a public capacity 
than in relation to private individuals. Therefore “politicians must display a 
greater degree of tolerance”.132 
By 2005, it was evident from the case-law brought to Strasbourg by Russian 
applicants that the judicial interpretation of Article 152 of the RF Civil Code 
was not yet compatible with these core principles. An underlying problem may 
certainly have been a degree of mismatch between the European and Russian 
understandings of the legitimate limits of freedom of expression. As analyzed 
elsewhere, there has traditionally been greater emphasis in the Russian context on 
the responsibilities of the press with regard to national unity.133 The countervailing 
interests specified in Article 10(2) of the ECHR—national security, public safety, 
the protection of public morals etc.—arguably have carried a different weighting 
within a Russian judicial culture attuned to the importance of collectivism. 
However, that is not to say that those countervailing interests should always 
prevail over freedom of expression.134 Inevitably, inconsistencies in application of 
general principle have also raised pressing questions regarding possible political 
intervention in the deliberations of the courts and the partiality of the judiciary.135 
But a yet more fundamental obstacle posed by the wording of Article 152 
was that, even on an expansive reading, it was not clear how the assessment 
131  Pedersen v. Denmark (17 December 2004) No.49017/99, 42 EHRR 24, para. 76.
132  Jerusalem v. Austria (27 February 2001) No.26958/95, 37 EHRR 25, para. 38
133  For discussion, see Schönfeld, op.cit. note 62, 275-278.
134  Ibid.
135    On the extra-judicial pressures to which the judiciary has allegedly been subjected in some cases see 
Obukhova v. Russia (8 January 2009) No.34736/03; and Kudeshkina v. Russia (26 February 2009) 
No.29492/05, 52 EHRR 37. On concerns as to the impartiality of the judiciary in relation to media 
matters, see Schönfeld, op.cit. note 62, 280-281. For an example raising such concerns, contrast two 
cases: both heard in Moscow courts in February 2011 and involving the question whether the individual 
plaintiff had been sufficiently identified as a member of a defamed “class”. In Milov v. Putin, Savelovskii 
District Court, Moscow City (14 February 2011), Case No.2-1779/11, Putin had responded to a question 
on a television phone-in program, “What do Nemstsov, Ryzhkov, Milov and so on really want?” with 
the following: 
   “Money and power, what else do they want? In their time they caused chaos, in the 90s—along 
with Berezovskii and others who are now in prison. […] they made off with quite a few billion. 
They’ve been dragged away from the hand that fed them, they’ve gone bust, and they want to 
come back and fill their pockets. But I think that if we allow them to do that they won’t stop at a 
few billion—they will sell up the whole of Russia.” 
   Milov’s claim failed because the remarks were not taken as generalizations that did not apply to Nemtsov, 
Ryzhkov, Milov specifically as individuals. The outcome of that case is difficult to reconcile with that of 
Timchenko v. Milov and Nemstov, Zamoskvoretskii District Court, Moscow City (22 February 2011) 
Case No.2-649/2011. Timchenko, a billionaire industrialist, took issue with a pamphlet written by 
Nemstov and Milov, plaintiffs in the first case, stating that: “Putin’s old friends, who were nobodies before 
he came to power [including Timchenko] have turned themselves into dollar millionaires.” In contrast 
with the previous case, this assertion was regarded not simply as an unexceptionable generalization but, 
instead, an attack on the individual worth of Timchenko, and his claim was accordingly successful. 
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of the interests of freedom of expression was to be factored into the civil law 
remedy. Article 152 was directed expressly at injury to honor and dignity, without 
countervailing provisions—proportionate or otherwise—to address freedom of 
expression or to privilege commentary on matters of public interest. Against that 
background it was perhaps unsurprising that the Russian courts have not found 
it easy to incorporate reference to the ECHR—or to its interpretation in ECtHR 
jurisprudence—into their reasoning. Quite simply, this European material could 
not readily be mapped across into the basic framework as presented by Article 
152. A survey by the NGO, the Article 19 Global Campaign for Free Expression, 
scrutinized a sample of 102 defamation cases heard in Russian courts between 
2002 and 2006.136 It found that reference to European authority was infrequent 
and superficial, particularly in the earlier part of the period under review. Only 
in nineteen of the 102 cases was there reference to the ECHR, and even fewer—
seven—cited ECtHR case law. Even then, when European authority was cited, this 
was almost always the leading case of Lingens v. Austria137 (perhaps because this 
1985 decision had been one of the first to become available in Russian translation). 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, there were several key areas in which European authority 
had not been consulted or applied and the practice of the Russian courts did not 
meet with European human rights standards.138 The conclusions of Article 19 
(admittedly not entirely disinterested) were borne out by the observations of the 
ECtHR in relation to Russian applications of this nature brought to Strasbourg. 
It noted in some instances that the reasoning of the domestic courts had been 
flawed to the extent that they made little attempt at balancing the competing 
demands of Articles 8 and 10 in an even-handed and informed fashion; indeed, 
in some cases they ignored the ECHR altogether. In the 2009 decision Krutov 
v. Russia, for example, Russian courts were found to have confined their analysis 
to the plaintiff’s interest “without giving any consideration to the Convention 
standard which requires very strong reasons for justifying restrictions on debates 
on questions of public interest initiated by members of the press”.139 In Romanenko 
v. Russia (also 2009), the ECtHR concluded that Russian courts had failed even 
to recognize that the case presented a conflict between protection of reputation 
and the right to freedom of expression.140
136  Art.19, The Cost of Reputation: Defamation Law and Practice in Russia (2007) <available at http://www.
article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/russia-defamation-rpt.pdf>. Of these claims, approximately 
one-half have been rejected while the other half have been upheld (see detailed figures at 35).
137  (1985) No.9815/82, 7 EHRR CD446.
138  Art.19, op.cit. note 136, 39-42.
139    (3 December 2009) No.15469/04, para. 28. (Newspaper article concerning the interplay of political 
groups in the Saratov Region and, in particular, the role of the Prosecutor’s office.)
140    (8 October 2009) No.11751/03, see para. 42. (Article calling into question the management by public 
bodies of forestry resources.)
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A particular challenge in translating European standards into practice under 
Article 152 was that the text of the Code did not articulate any distinction between 
fact and comment or opinion.141 Accordingly, the Russian courts tended to treat 
both in the same way, referring uniformly to information/statements (“svedeniia”), 
and operating on “the assumption that any such statement was amenable to 
proof in civil proceedings”.142 Irrespective of whether the contested statement was 
straightforward fact or a value judgment, the defendant avoided liability under in 
Article 152 of the Civil Code only by demonstrating that it “corresponded with 
reality” (“chto oni sootvetstvuiut deistvitel’nosti”). But this formulation presented 
particular problems in relation to political speech by media defendants. While 
“correspondence with reality” might readily be judged one way or another in 
relation to straightforward factual assertions, this was much harder for the kind 
of statements of opinion or comments typically found in political journalism, 
especially if couched in metaphorical language. Cases brought to the Russian 
courts in the 1990s showed that it has hardly been possible to prove the literal 
truth of comments such as that the plaintiff’s fortune was “made from the woes 
and tears of simple people”, and that “whatever he undertakes is damned”,143 that 
a regional governor had implemented policies that were “selfish and destructive”,144 
or that teachers were frightened to express concern about the management style of 
an education authority.145 The case of Fedchenko v. Russia146 offers a fairly typical 
illustration of such problems.147 Fedchenko was the editor of a newspaper that 
had published an article that was critical of various management failures in the 
141  Art.19, op.cit. note 136, 42; also commentary in Novaya Gazeta v. Voronezhe v. Russia (21 December 
2010) No.27570/03, (regarding material published in 2002), reproduced at <http://www.echr.coe.int/
echr/>. 
142  Grinberg v. Russia (21 July 2005) No.23472/03, (2006) 43 EHRR 45, para. 29.
143  Andrushko v. Russia (14 October 2010) No.4260/04, reproduced at <http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/>. 
144  Dyuldin and Kislov v. Russia (31 July 2007) No.25968/02, (2009)48 EHRR 6.
145    Fedchenko v. Russia (11 February 2010) No.48195/06, reproduced at <http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/>.
146  Judgment (11 February 2010) No.48195/06.
147    A striking earlier illustration of such problems was found in the case brought by Vladimir Zhirinovskii, 
citing the equivalent provision in Art.7 of the 1991 Fundamentals and seeking moral damages from 
Izvestiia newspaper and from former Deputy Prime Minister, Egor Gaidar (discussed in Krug, op.cit. 
note 110, 327). The newspaper had alleged Zhirinovskii to be a “fascist”. Its argument that it had been 
presenting an analytical appraisal of the plaintiff’s political character was ineffective as an answer to 
liability under Art.7. In an attempt to dress up as verifiable fact what was essentially unverifiable as the 
expression of a point of view, the defendants attempted to assert specific parallels between the plaintiff’s 
writing and that of Hitler, and between 1920s Germany and 1990s Russia. Unsurprisingly, the newspaper 
was held not to have discharged the burden of proof required in order to establish this defense. But cf. 
now Karman v. Russia (14 December 2006) No.29372/02, (2009) 48 EHRR 21, in which a politician 
successfully sued a journalist and the newspaper in which he had been described as a “neofascist”. The 
national courts held that the defendants had failed to discharge the burden of demonstrating that the 
politician was in fact a neofascist. However, in this instance, the defendants applied to the ECtHR 
which ruled that such language did not exceed the acceptable limits of political criticism and that their 
right to freedom of expression under Art.10 of the Convention had been violated.
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educational system in the Briansk Region and, in particular, the conduct of the 
head of the regional Department of Education. The departmental head brought 
a successful claim under Article 152 in the Sovietskii District Court, which was 
substantially upheld in the Briansk Regional Court. On Fedchenko’s application 
to Strasbourg, however, the European Court found that in various aspects the 
rulings of the Russian courts had violated Article 10. In particular, classification 
of these assertions as factual statements interfered in an unwarranted way with 
the author’s rights to express “subjective opinion”. In criticizing management 
failings, Fedchenko had “done no more than fulfill the essential role of the press, 
that is, to impart information and solicit debate”.148 Most importantly: 
“[…] the defendant in a defamation case concerning criticism of a public official’s perfor-
mance of his duties may not be required to prove the truth of all his factual assertions. This 
would but stifle public debate on matters of genuine public concern.” 149
In some cases where media defendants were required to “prove” the truth of 
their stories, their difficulties were further exacerbated by the imposition of an 
extremely high standard of proof—suitable perhaps for establishing the guilt in 
a criminal matter but not for judging the conduct of the parties in a civil case.150 
The imposition of such a standard in relation to value judgments of this nature 
was, in many cases, therefore a disproportionate interference with the right to 
freedom of opinion, particularly where the defendant was a journalist and the 
alleged injury was the expression of an opinion on a matter of public concern.
A related problem in these early cases was that Article 152 did not distinguish 
political speech from remarks directed at conduct in other contexts. Consequently, 
there was little acceptance that, in the interests of public debate, those who 
performed public functions—politicians in particular but, also, public servants 
generally151—should expect to be “subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism 
than private individuals” in the conduct of those functions.152 Indeed, the judiciary 
“routinely” made allowance for the plaintiff’s public status by awarding increased 
damages153 (reflecting an understanding, as in earlier times, that if these purpose 
of these provision was to address loss of honor and dignity, such persons had 
more to lose). This was another feature of judicial reasoning in Fedchenko which 
148  Fedchenko (2010), op.cit. note 145, para. 43. 
149  Ibid., para. 56.
150  See, e.g., Karman v. Russia (2006), op.cit. note 147, para. 42; and Novaya Gazeta v. Voronezhe v. Russia 
(2010), op.cit. note 141. 
151  Novaya Gazeta, ibid. 
152  Dyundin v. Russia (2011), op.cit. note 117, para. 33.
153  See discussion in Art.19, op.cit. note 136, 38. On a related matter, the European court noted the “sound 
policy reasons” why—in the interests of open debate—public authorities should not be attributed with 
standing to sue for defamation, but it did not make a formal ruling on whether the Russian practice 
permitting them to do so per se represented a breach of Art.10. Romanenko v. Russia (8 October 2009) 
No.11751/03, para 39, reproduced at <http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/>. 
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was criticized by the European Court—the domestic courts had not properly 
considered the fundamental principle that civil servants, like the plaintiff, were 
subject to wider limits of criticism than private individuals and were obliged 
to tolerate a certain level of public discussion.154 “Effective criticism” required 
reference to “specific figures and persons”,155 and “journalistic freedom” could 
extend to “a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation”.156 
4.2.2. RF Supreme Court Decree (24 February 2005) No.3
In short, the commitment to import the standards contained in the ECHR had 
left numerous unresolved problems for judicial practice, and it was acknowledged 
that these required a vigorous response.157 In 2003, the RF Supreme Court issued 
a Decree emphasizing the weight to be attributed to human rights considerations 
in judicial reasoning.158 It declared that the practice of the Russian courts was 
to be aligned with the principles and norms of international law including the 
ECHR, as well as the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.159 A further Decree in Febru-
ary 2005 was specifically directed at cases relating to injuries to reputation.160 The 
coordinates by which judicial practice was to be set were noted in the Preamble 
to the Decree: Article 23 of the Russian Constitution protecting honor, dignity 
and business reputation but, also, Article 29 protecting freedom of thought 
and expression as well as freedom of the media; Article 15 of the Constitution 
which gave the norms of international law direct effect; and ECHR Article 10, 
with special reference to Article 10(2) (on the extent to which freedom of speech 
may legitimately be restricted). In particular, Article 10 was to be interpreted 
according to the “legal position”161 of the ECtHR, as expressed in its judgments. 
The 2005 Decree summarized the essential requirements of Article 152—
that the defendant had published information which impugned the character of 
154  Ibid., para. 45. 
155  Ibid., para. 59.
156  Ibid., para. 34. 
157  Decree of the Plenum of the RF Supreme Court (24 February 2005) No.3, “O sudebnoi praktike po 
delam o zashchite i dostoinstva grazhdan, a takzhe delovoi reputatsii grazhdan i iuridicheskikh lits”, 
preamble (full text published on Supreme Court website at <http://www.supcourt.ru/second.php>). 
158    The RF Supreme Court is empowered inter alia to issue explanations of judicial practice in order to 
ensure uniformity across the courts of the Russian Federation, as well as to decide questions arising out 
of the international obligations of the Russian Federation. 2011 Federal Constitutional Law “O sudakh 
obshchei iurisdiktsii RF” (7 February 2011) No.1-FKZ, SZRF (2011) No.7 item 898, Art.9. On the 
status of such Decrees as sources of law, see A.L. Burkov, “Status Postanovlenii Plenuma Verkhovnogo 
Suda RF v Zakonodatel’stve i sudebnoi praktike”, Pravovedenie (2011) No.5, 172-186; and William 
Pomeranz and Max Gutbrod, “The Push for Precedent in Russia’s Judicial System”, 37(1) Review of 
Central and East European Law (2012), 1-30. 
159  Decree of the Plenum of the RF Supreme Court (10 October 2003), No.5, and see 1993 RF Constitution, 
op.cit. note 64, Art.15.
160  Decree of the Plenum of the RF Supreme Court (24 February 2005) No.3, op.cit. note 157. 
161  Ibid., Preamble, para. 3 (“pravovaia pozitsiia”).
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the plaintiff in such a way as to infringe Article 23.162 There were also pointers 
to the sort of material to be regarded as damaging to reputation—allegations 
that the plaintiff had broken the law or had engaged in dishonorable conduct; 
improper, unethical behavior in the private social or political sphere. And in 
place of the references to “socialist communal life” of the 1960s, the courts were 
directed to have regard to accusations of unscrupulousness in the industrial or 
commercial context or of violation of business ethics or business practices.163 
Most significantly, the Decree also gave direction in relation to cases involving 
public figures. Political figures and state officials should anticipate robust public 
scrutiny and criticism of their activities insofar as this related to their official 
duties and “insofar as this is necessary to ensure the transparent and responsible 
exercise of their powers”.164 The Decree referred the Russian courts to the 2004 
Council of Europe Declaration on Freedom of Political Debate in the Media,165 
to the effect that a higher threshold of tolerance of criticism was to be imposed 
upon political figures and public officials and that any remedies awarded were to 
be proportionate. The Decree also addressed the burden placed upon the defen-
dant whereby liability was avoided only by proof that the information did not 
“correspond with reality”.166 In order to ensure compliance with constitutional 
requirements,167 the assertion of facts and the expression of subjective opinions 
were to be distinguished.168 The Decree acknowledged that while the correspon-
dence of the former could readily be verified in terms of Article 152, the latter 
could not be checked one way or another against such a standard. It reasoned 
162  Ibid., para. 7.
163  Ibid., para. 7.
164  Ibid., para. 9. The text suggested the influence of European jurisprudence. See, e.g., Lingens v. Austria, 
op.cit. note 137, para. 52: 
 “The limits of acceptable criticism are […] wider as regards a politician as such than as regards 
a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to 
close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must 
consequently display a greater degree of tolerance. No doubt Article 10(2) enables the reputation of 
others—that is to say, of all individuals—to be protected, and this protection extends to politicians 
too, even when they are not acting in their private capacity; but in such cases the requirements 
of such protection have to be weighed in relation to the interests of open discussion of political 
issues.”
165    Adopted by the Committee of Ministers (12 February 2004), reproduced on the Council of Europe 
website at <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=118995&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=9999CC&
BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75>; see paras. 3 and 4. 
166  Decree of the Plenum of the RF Supreme Court (24 February 2005) No.3, op.cit. note 157, para. 9.
167  Arts.23 and 29 of the 1993 RF Russian Constitution, op.cit. note 64, and ECHR Art.10. However, 
the 2005 Decree provided a reminder that even where comment or expression of opinion escaped 
liability under Art.152, this did not exonerate for the purposes of criminal liability under Art.130 of 
the Criminal Code if the content was sufficiently insulting (para. 9).
168  Decree of the Plenum of the RF Supreme Court (24 February 2005) No.3, op.cit. note 157, para. 9.
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that expression of opinion should not, therefore, be considered as within the 
scope of Article 152. 
The 2005 Decree was thus a notable milestone, indicating at the very least 
that Article 152 no longer presented an “exclusive, self-contained, comprehensive 
system of rules” within Russian domestic law.169 Indeed, in its Commentary on 
the Decree published in the same year, the Glasnost’ Defense Foundation170 drew 
attention to the document’s far-reaching implications in opening up European 
legal principles to journalists and in enabling them to argue their cases by mak-
ing direct reference to European jurisprudence.171 This acknowledgement of the 
authority of European jurisprudence was in itself of major importance. At the 
same time, little analysis was to follow—at Supreme Court level or elsewhere—
to explain and disseminate the content of those European authorities, and no 
further was there detailed guidance provided for determining the proper limits 
of political speech.172 
Some limited assistance in filling this gap could be found, however, in a later 
(2010) Decree of the Supreme Court (No.16), “On the Practical Application 
by the Courts of the Law on the Mass Media”. This differentiated between, on 
the one hand, “information on facts […] capable of exerting a positive influence 
on public discussion of matters concerning, for example, the fulfillment of their 
functions by public officials and public figures”, and, on the other, “detailed in-
formation about the private life of a person not engaged in any public activity”. 
The media have a duty to inform citizens of the former, but they have no such 
role in relation to the latter.173 This section of the Decree was directed primarily 
169  See commentary in Peter Krug, “Internalizing European Court of Human Rights Interpretations: 
Russia’s Courts of General Jurisdiction and New Directions in Civil Defamation Law”, 32 Brook.J.Int’l 
L. (2006-2007), 1-66 at 16.
170  A Russian NGO whose objectives are to promote freedom of speech and protect the independence of 
journalists. Its website provides information on developments seen as threatening these areas as well as 
commentary on legal matters. See <http://www.gdf.ru/>.
171  Kommentarii k Postanovleniiu Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda RF No 3 ot 24 fevralia 2005 g., available at 
<http://gdf.ru/article/item/1/7/>.
172  See, e.g., Review by the Supreme Court in 2007 of judicial practice in defamation and breach of 
privacy: “Obzor praktiki rassmotreniia sudami Rossiiskoi Federatsii del o zashchite chesti, dostoinstva 
i delovoi reputatsii”, Biulleten’ Verkhovnogo Suda RF (2007) No.12 available at <http://www.supcourt.
ru/print_page.php?id=5137>. The Review singled out and endorsed a decision of 22 March 2005 from 
the Sovietskii District Count in Tula ruling that a newspaper’s “ironic” coverage of the conduct of a 
public official was not defamatory since it addressed matters of public interest, namely questions of 
administrative reform. However, while, it cited the leading European cases of Lingens v. Austria (1986) 
op.cit. note 137; Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria (1995), op.cit. note 128; and De Haes and Gijsels v. 
Belgium (24 February 1997) No.19983/92, (1998) 25 EHRR 1, it offered no further guidance as to 
the applicability of these authorities in the Russian context or how they related to the framework of 
Art.152.
173  Decree of the Plenum of the RF Supreme Court (15 June 2010) No.16, “O praktike primeneniia sudami 
Zakona RF ‘O sredstvakh massovoi informatsii’”, para. 25; translation as provided by the Supreme 
Court website at <http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=6786)>. (Russian text at <http://
www.supcourt.ru/second.php>.)
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at breach of privacy, rather than defamation. Nevertheless, it offered some as-
sistance in demarcating those spheres of activity by public officials upon which 
the press was entitled to comment and those upon which it was not. 
A later paragraph in the same document also appeared to advocate a nuanced 
approach to the public information function of the media, directing the courts 
in general terms to make concessions for the complex and shifting environment 
in which the media operated. In judging whether there had been an abuse of 
freedom of expression by the media , the courts were to have regarded to the 
context and to: 
“[…] consider not only the use in the article, TV or radio program of a word or expression 
(the wording) but also the context in which they were put (particularly the aim, genre and the 
style of the article, program or their specific part, if it is possible to view them as an opinion 
in the sphere of political discussion or a drawing of attention to the discussion of socially 
important matters, and what the attitude of the interviewer and/or the representatives of 
the editorial staff of the mass media towards the expressed opinions, judgments, statements 
is) as well as the social and political situation in the country as such or in its specific part 
(depending on the area of distribution of the mass media).” 174
In a further move to discourage excessive awards of damages, the Supreme 
Court issued another Decree (No. 21) on in late 2010175 adding a further two 
paragraphs to its June (No.16) Decree. The September 2010 Decree directed 
that where moral damages were awarded to compensate for injury suffered as a 
result of a media publication, the amount should be consistent with the purpose 
for which it was intended. In other words, it should provide compensation for 
the plaintiff’s physical or moral suffering but should not be used as a weapon to 
limit freedom of expression. As stipulated in Article 1101(2) of the Civil Code, 
the sum awarded should be “reasonable and just”, without “destroying” freedom 
of mass information (i ne vesti k narusheniiu svobody massovoi informatsii), and 
this appeal to moderation was equally relevant whether the plaintiff was a private 
individual or a public figure. In other words, the practice of awarding relatively 
higher figures by way of compensation to those in the public sphere was to be 
discontinued.176 
The combined effect of these 2005 and 2010 Supreme Court Decrees, 
therefore, was to give a strong steer on the importance of European standards in 
assessing whether the defendant in defamation cases could invoke the right freely 
to express political opinions. They did not establish Strasbourg jurisprudence 
174  Ibid., para. 28.
175  Decree of the Plenum of the RF Supreme Court (16 September 2010), “O vnesenii izmenenii v 
postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovhogo Suda RF ot 15 June 2010 No 16 ‘O praktike primeneniia sudami 
Zakona RF ‘O sredstvakh massovoi informatsii’”, adding paras. 37 and 38 to the earlier Decree. Text 
available at Supreme court website at <http://www.supcourt.ru/second.php>.
176  See note by N. Kozlova, “Prigovor v rubliakh”, Rossiiskaia gazeta (20 September 2010), reporting that 
private individuals might expect moral damages of 3-5 thousand rubles, whereas public figures regularly 
obtained 7-figure sums.
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as binding precedent in the Russian domestic court but did point to use of Eu-
ropean decisions as a vital resource in interpreting the ECHR and in guarding 
against future findings of violation by the ECtHR.177 At the same time, many 
practical problems were left unresolved. It was not clear how exactly the lower 
courts—relatively unschooled in handling case law, particularly when this included 
European authorities178—were to assimilate such material into a coherent body 
of principle suitable for practical application. More fundamentally, it had not 
been explained in any detail how precisely those standards were to be translated 
into the existing strict liability framework of Article 152.
4.2.3 The Impact of the 2005 Decree
The 2005 Decree did not transform the practice of the Russian courts overnight. 
For example, the 2010 case of Fedchenko v. Russia, discussed above,179 arose out 
of defamation proceedings brought against the applicant in the Russian courts in 
2006, just a few months after the publication of the 2005 Decree. The findings 
of the European Court in that case point—in no uncertain terms—to a failure 
to meet European standards with regard to the very issues specifically addressed 
in the 2005 Decree. Gradually, however, the 2005 Decree has begun to make 
an impact. The 2007 Article 19 Survey, noted above,180 analyzed cases between 
the years 2002-2006. An important finding was that while prior to 2005 only 
a very small proportion of cases had referred to European authority, after 2005 
two-thirds of the cases studied mentioned the Decree and the need to apply the 
ECHR and European jurisprudence. Admittedly, there were significant regional 
variations: European authorities were much more frequently used and journalists 
were more likely to invoke them successfully in their defense in areas where they 
had access to the resources of organizations such as the Voronezh-based Mass 
Media Defense Centre or the Moscow-based Agora Human Rights Association.181 
But, of course, a major change in the post-2005 period has been the emergence 
not only of a cadre of Russian lawyers receptive to ECtHR jurisprudence but, 
also, of a considerable body of ECtHR case law brought by Russian applicants, 
as exemplified in Fedchenko. While the Russian courts may have been slow in 
177  For discussion see Krug, op.cit. note 169, 43ff.
178  See Anton Burkov, The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Russian Law (Ibidem-
Verlag, Stuttgart, 2007), 72-77; and Galina Arapova, “Russian Case-Law in the Framework of Article 
10 of the European Convention”, presentation delivered at a seminar at the ECtHR organized by 
Robert Schuman University (Strasbourg), Ghent University and the Open Society Justice Initiative   (10 
October 2008), available at <http://www-ircm.u-strasbg.fr/seminaire_oct2008/docs/Report_Galina_
Arapova_Session_III.pdf>. 
179  Op.cit. note 146.
180  Op.cit. note 136.
181  Mass-Media Defense Centre (<www.mmdc.narod.ru>) is a not-for-profit organization whose primary 
purposes are stated as promoting freedom of expressing and supporting journalists in asserting their 
constitutional rights. Agora <www.openinform.ru/about/show/7/>) is an inter-regional defense which 
also assists journalists as well as bloggers and NGOs in resisting unlawful government interference.
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assimilating the case law involving other respondent states (apart from obvious 
leading cases such as Lingens), cases involving Russia were easier to obtain in 
translation—and harder to ignore. If the 2005 Decree directed the Russian courts 
to apply European jurisprudence, these cases have provided more specific, and 
linguistically-accessible,182 reference points on how this might be done. Examina-
tion of domestic cases six years after the 2005 Decree indicates that, while the 
citation of jurisprudence originating from other states may remain infrequent 
and lacking in detail in the lower courts, the recent cases involving Russian ap-
plicants to the ECtHR are noted and discussed.183
A measure of the impact of European authority is a sign of a growing 
recognition that expression of opinion or comment should be treated differently 
from assertions of fact. While the distinction still causes some degree of confusion 
and the principles continue to be applied “selectively”,184 it is no longer widely 
disregarded, as it had been prior to 2005. Significant numbers of allegedly 
defamatory remarks are now classed as the former, thus permitting media 
defendants to escape liability under Article 152 (although there is acceptance that 
even the expression of comment may be actionable if it is completely lacking in 
factual foundation).185 A telling comparison, indicating increasing tolerance in 
the approach to comment, can be found in the following two cases, two years 
apart, again both from District Courts in Moscow. 
The 2009 case of Kadyrov v. Orlov186 arose out of the circumstances 
surrounding the murder in Chechnya of Natalia Estemirova, a human rights 
activist. The defendant had stated on the website of a human rights campaign 
group: 
“I know, I am sure who is guilty of the murder of Natalia Estemirova. We all know that 
man. His name is Ramzan Kadyrov, president of the Chechen Republic. Ramzan had already 
threatened Natalia, insulted her, and considered her his personal enemy. We do not know 
whether he himself gave the order or whether it was given by his close comrades-in-arms 
to please the boss. […]”187 
The court in this case applied a literal reading of the wording used, referring to 
standard Russian language dictionaries to find, unsurprisingly, that use of the 
182  For a first-hand account of the difficulties of citing ECtHR jurisprudence in Russian courts, where it 
cannot be assumed that judges or counsel have the linguistic skills to read judgments in the original 
languages, see Arapova, op.cit. note 178. 
183  See, e.g., Prytsakov v. Shelimova, Volgodonskoi District Court, Rostov Region (8 February 2011) Case 
No.2-42/11; and Korolevskii v. Avilov, Volgodonskoi District Court, Rostov Region (3 May 2011) Case 
No.2-1660/11.
184  Art.19, op.cit. note 136, 42-43.
185  Novaya Gazeta v. Voronezhe v. Russia (2010), op.cit. note 141, para. 53; and on this point see Prager and 
Oberschlick v. Austria (1995), op.cit. note 128, para. 33.
186  Tver District Court, Moscow City (6 October 2009).
187  “Ia znaiu, ia uveren v tom, kto vinoven v ubiistve.”
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word “killer”188 was indeed defamatory, but showing little regard to the Supreme 
Court’s instruction that the context of publication must also be considered.189 
The 2005 Decree was noted, but the court regarded Orlov as having stated a 
fact, rather than having expressed an opinion, by use of the wording: “I know, I 
am sure of who is guilty of the killing.” Article 152 was therefore engaged,190 and 
the defendant was unable to prove that the statements corresponded with reality.
By contrast, the later (2011) case of Iakemenko v. Morozov and Kashin191 
applied the opposite interpretation to a very similar formulation. In that case, the 
Chair of the Federal Committee for Youth Affairs argued that the defendants, well-
known journalists, had defamed him by insinuating that he had masterminded a 
physical assault on one of them, Kashin. As in the Estemirova case, no criminal 
prosecution had been brought. The court cited the 2005 Decree, and the need to 
take into account the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, although it did not refer to 
any specific European case. As in the Kadyrov case, it applied a very close literal 
reading of the allegedly defamatory imputation. Morozov had made various 
vague assertions in a blog about the criminal investigations into the assault. 
However, Morozov’s blog also asked how it would be “possible now to divulge 
the results of the investigation if it uncovers a direct link between the attackers 
and the Iakemenko organization?” The court held that since this was a question 
it could not be regarded as a statement of Iakemenko’s guilt. Kashin himself 
wrote that “in fact I myself do not doubt the ‘Iakemenko’ version, and I don’t 
have any alternative versions”.192 Perhaps more surprisingly, the court regarded 
this wording as the expression of Kashin’s opinion, not a factual assertion of 
Iakemenko’s participation in crime. In other words, for Kadyrov court “I know, 
I am sure that” presented fact, whereas for the Iakemenko court two years later 
“I myself do not doubt” prefaced the expression of opinion. 
At the same time, while the increased receptivity to this distinction is certainly 
a welcome development, if labeling imputations as comment remains the main 
device for absolving those whom the courts regard as having been justified in 
putting information into the public domain, there may even be a tendency to 
stretch, and thereby distort, the boundaries of comment, as arguably occurred in 
the Iakemenko case. The distinction between fact and opinion cannot be drawn 
with precision; it must be approached in a consistent and reasoned way if an 
even-handed balance between competing interests is to be achieved.
188  “Ubiitsa”.
189  See text op.cit. note 174.
190  It should be noted, however, that in criminal proceedings for defamation Orlov was ultimately acquitted. 
The court held that an individual should not be held criminally liable for statements he or she believed 
to be true, and that no evidence of a criminal intent on behalf of the defendant had been disclosed. 
Khamovniki District Court, Moscow City (14 June 2011). 
191  Khamovniki District Court, Moscow City (27 June 2011) Case No.2-1267/11.
192  “Na samom dele ia i sam ne somnevaius’ v ‘iakemenkovskoi’ versii, i drugikh versii u menia net.”
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In any event, distinguishing fact from comment cannot serve as a sufficient 
shield for freedom of expression in all circumstances. The distinction is embedded 
in the wording of ECHR Article 10(1) and, of course, is not unique to Russian 
law. Presentation of false facts necessarily merits harsher treatment than expression 
of comment or opinion. But effective reporting must contain some factual data 
if debate on matters of public concern is not to be converted “into a purely 
fictitious concept”.193 An illustration of the difficulties left unresolved by increased 
leniency towards comment can be found in a later case involving the applicant in 
Fedchenko v. Russia discussed above.194 Some time after Fedchenko’s application to 
the ECtHR, his newspaper published an article alleging nepotism and profiteering 
in the award to the director of a local steel plant of a citizenship prize worth 
1.8 million rubles. The information was presented in such a way that could not 
plausibly be characterized as representing opinion only; since the literal truth of 
the allegations could not be proved, the claim was upheld.195 It is arguable that 
in cases of this nature, involving information of public interest, the interests of 
freedom of expression require some concessions to be extended to the journalist 
who has researched a story responsibly but has simply got some of the facts 
wrong—or, at least, cannot prove that they are completely true. The obligation 
to verify facts is an onerous one, but the jurisprudence of the ECtHR indicates 
that it is not absolute. It should not extend to establishing truth where this is “an 
unreasonable, if not impossible, task”,196 particularly where a story engages “the 
right of the public to be informed quickly about matters of legitimate general 
concern”.197 However, such concessions cannot readily be accommodated within 
the strict liability framework of Article 152, absolving the media defendant only 
when the literal truth of the story is proved.
As discussed above,198 the RF Supreme Court ruled in its 2010 Decree that 
the Russian courts should not permit Article 152—under the guise of protection 
of honor and dignity—to be used as a weapon to limit freedom of expression. 
However, the continuing impact of the Decree will necessarily be limited by 
the absence of specific frameworks by which due consideration for freedom of 
expression might be integrated into the reasoning of the Russian courts. No 
amendment to the strict liability regime of Article 152 has been proposed in order 
to accommodate expression on matters of public interest. And while Article 49(2) 
193    Fedchenko v. Russia (2010), op.cit. note 146, para. 59; see, also, Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, op.cit. 
note 128.
194  Note 146 supra.
195  Voronin v. Fedchenko, Briansk Regional Court (18 July 2011) Case No.2-27/2011.
196  Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway (20 May 1999) No.21980/93, (2000) 29 EHRR 125, para. 87 of the 
Commission’s Opinion.
197  Observer v. UK (1991), op.cit. note 127, para. 11.
198  See text at notes 175 and 176 supra.
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of the 1991 Law on the Mass Information Media requires journalists to “verify 
the authenticity of the information communicated to them”, no concession is 
made within the civil law to those journalists who were ultimately mistaken but 
who can demonstrate that they have fulfilled this responsibility to a reasonable 
standard “in accordance with the ethics of journalism”.199 Admittedly, the 2005 
Decree enjoined the Russian courts to apply human rights standards in domestic 
law by reference to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. But it asks much that the 
Russian courts should in effect reform the law in such a fundamental way, if there 
is no amendment to the Civil Code, and their main tool is the case law derived 
from a court that not only employs a very different style of judicial reasoning 
but, also, does not generally publish its judgments in Russian. 
In order to provide appropriate support to the media in their role as 
“purveyor of information and public watchdog”,200 Russia might usefully look 
beyond the fact/comment distinction to the mechanisms applied in domestic 
law elsewhere in Europe that mitigate the rigor of strict liability.201 In German 
law, for example, mere expression of opinion does not normally attract liability; 
202 and, in addition, there is a general defense available where publication is 
deemed to have been in the legitimate public interest.203 English law regards 
liability for defamation as strict; and in addition to a defense of “fair” or “honest” 
comment,204 it offers media defendants a “qualified privilege” defense, recently 
re-conceptualized in the light of European jurisprudence. Privilege attaches to 
“responsible” journalism on matters of public interest, even if the offending 
imputation has been presented as fact, in effect replacing strict liability with a 
negligence-based standard in this context.205
199  Compliance with this standard should mean that freedom of expression is protected, at least in the view 
of the ECtHR in Dyundin v. Russia (2008), op.cit. note 117, para. 28.
200  Barthold v. Germany (25 March 1985) No.8734/79, (1985) 7 EHRR 383, para. 58.
201  See, generally, Maryann McMahon, “Defamation Claims in Europe: A Survey of the Legal Armory”, 
19(4) Communications Lawyer (2002), 24, including discussion of the “good faith” defense available in 
France and in The Netherlands, i.e., where the journalist had reasonable belief in the factual basis for 
the story reported. 
202  Expression of opinion is actionable if deemed to be a malicious insult (Schmähkritik), with the consequence 
that in marginal cases there is a tendency to label imputations as opinion rather than fact. For discussion 
see, e.g., Alexander Burns, “Access to Media Sources in Defamation Litigation in the United States and 
Germany”, 10 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l. L. (1999-2000), 283-306. 
203  For a comparative overview of protection for expression of opinion in several European jurisdictions, 
see McMahon, op.cit. note 201, 24-37.
204  Joseph v. Spiller (2011) 1 AC 852; and see now a Defamation Bill, before Parliament at the time of writing, 
in which s.3 provides for the expression of “honest opinion” available at <http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2012-2013/0005/13005.pdf>.
205  Reynolds v. Times Newspapers (2001) 2 AC 127; Jameel v. Wall Street Journal sprl (2007) 1 AC 359; and 
see now the Defamation Bill, before Parliament at the time of writing, that contains (in s.4) a defense 
for “Responsible publication on matter of public interest” to the effect that the journalist was not 
negligent. Op.cit. note 204. 
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5. Conclusion: Future Challenges 
Protection for reputation is deeply embedded within the Russian legal tradition, 
and to that extent the post-Soviet Russian law of defamation was not written on 
a tabula rasa. Nevertheless, the restricted environment within which the press 
and media have developed is set apart from that found in many other members 
of the Council of Europe. It cannot therefore be said in Russia, as, for example, 
a member of the English judiciary once remarked, that the values to which the 
European Convention on Human Rights gives effect are “much the same”206 
values that Russian domestic law has already long accepted. Accordingly the 
incorporation of Convention rights into domestic law is no straightforward 
task. It has been left largely to the judiciary to accomplish this by building on 
the very basic framework of Article 152, the text of which has barely changed 
since Soviet times. Quite understandably there remains a lack of clarity not only 
about substantive mechanisms but, also, about the values to which the modern 
law should give effect. 
Traditionally, in Russia and elsewhere, reputation has been seen as a social 
construct and defamation as a social tort with the dual functions of “protecting 
individual dignity [as] a matter of defending purely private interests” as well as 
“enforcing rules of civility [as] a matter of safeguarding the public good inherent 
in the maintenance of community identity”.207 The Soviet law of defamation 
clearly could be seen as operating in the social context, preserving relationships 
within the socialist order, and changing notions of public good in the new Russia 
allowed the law to be extended to the protection of business and even corporate 
reputations. Inside and outside of Russia, however, much of the modern case law 
now ranges beyond the social or commercial sphere to allegations concerning 
the responsibilities of the publicly accountable or the public lives of the famous. 
In these contexts, its focus is not so much social or commercial reputation in 
a narrow sense but, rather, on determining the extent to which public identity 
should be shielded from unfair attack. For example, a defendant seen recently 
in defamation litigation is, for example, the “superblogger” Alexei Naval’nyi.208 
206  Lord Woolf, “European Court of Human Rights on the Occasion of the Opening of the Judicial Year”, 
European Human Rights Law Review (2003) No.3, 257-262, at 258.
207  Robert C. Post, “The Sociology of Libel”, 74 Cal. L. Rev. (1986), 691-742, at 713. 
208  Navalnyi’s website is at <http://navalny.ru/>. For a recent example of litigation involving Naval’nyi that 
perhaps raises questions over the impartiality of the judiciary see the 2012 case of Sviridov v. Naval’nyi. 
A claim had been brought against Naval’nyi by Sviridov, a member of the United Russia Party, on the 
basis that he personally was defamed by the colorful epithet coined by Naval’nyi in his blog and also 
recorded in an article in Esquire magazine (see <http://esquire.ru/wil/alexey-navalny>) that United Russia 
is a party of “swindlers and thieves” (“zhulikov i vorov”). Notwithstanding that the United Russia Party 
has many millions of members, the court found in Sviridov’s favor, and awarded damages of 30,000 
rubles, ordering Naval’nyi also to publish a refutation on his internet site. There is little question that 
the epithet “swindler and thief ” is defamatory as applied to an individual, but applying the logic of 
the 2011 Milov v. Putin case (op.cit. note 135), it is not clear that this generalization made of such a 
large class reasonably can be understood as impugning the probity of an individual party member. The 
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The main substance of his blogs relates to institutional corruption, in particular 
in relation to procurement for government contracts. Their effects are unlikely 
to be much felt within the social or even business relationships of those named 
by him, and his true target lies elsewhere. In such cases, notions of public good 
are served not only by permitting the plaintiff some measure of control over the 
means by which his or her public reputation is mediated but, also, by allowing 
the defendant’s voice to be heard within the proper limits of public debate.
This extension of the law of defamation into the public and political spheres 
entails a re-conceptualization of its traditional structures. As in the Soviet era,209 
this may require a reconsideration of how defamatoriness is to be measured, and 
the delineation of the defamatory will be particularly problematic in relation to 
new media where the conventions accepted by audiences are fluid. Recourse to 
decontextualized dictionary definitions, as applied in 2009 in Kadyrov v. Orlov,210 
is almost always an inadequate technique for determining whether reputation 
has been damaged; but it is particularly unhelpful, for example, in gauging the 
impact of an internet blog upon communities accustomed to the jargon and 
conventions of the blogosphere. A more nuanced approach is required that has 
regard to the estimation of the extended communities to which the remarks have 
been directed, and the beginnings of this are seen in the direction contained in 
the Supreme Court Decree of June 2010.211 
 But an even greater challenge is the need for proper engagement with the 
principle that freedom of expression—even potentially defamatory expression—
has a value for the author as well as for its audience, a concept accepted on 
paper by the Russian Federation’s ratification of the ECHR but not properly 
integrated into judicial practice. The value attributed to freedom of expression, 
in competition with reputation, is not absolute but, rather, varies according to 
context, as Article 10 indicates: the freedom to express personal insult, for example, 
may be accorded little priority as compared with political speech on a matter of 
public importance. ECtHR jurisprudence—now acknowledged by the Russian 
courts—provides guidance on the relative weight of competing interests, but it 
is for domestic law to supply the mechanisms by which these are adjudicated. 
As the mass media have grown in circulation in Russia and beyond, other 
European jurisdictions have developed more finely-balanced frameworks for this 
judgment, dating from the Liublinskii District Court in Moscow on 4 June 2012, does not seem to 
have been made publicly available, and was under appeal at the time of writing. For an account of the 
subsequent campaign to mobilize other Party members to sue Naval’nyi, thereby bankrupting him, see 
<http://навальногокответу.рф/> and Naval’nyi’s response at <http://navalny.livejournal.com/712841.
html>. 
209  See the text at note 46 supra. 
210  Op.cit. note 186. See the text at note 188 supra; also the literal interpretation of “abnormal” as in 
Chemodurov v. Russia (2007), op.cit. note 84.
211  As discussed in the text at note 174 supra.
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purpose.212 This has been achieved largely through case law—in codified as well 
as in common-law systems. However, it is significant that, even in the English 
common law, there is now a proposal for legislation to secure the foundation for 
a “responsible-journalism” defense.213 It is unreasonable to expect the Russian 
judiciary readily to construct and delimit such a defense unaided by domestic 
legislation and by reference to the jurisprudence of a court thousands of miles 
distant and not generally available in the Russian language. Reform of the Civil 
Code provisions, augmenting the framework of Article 152, would do much to 
support the judges in determining the proper limits of political speech for the 
twenty-first century. 
212  See the text to notes 202-205 supra.
213  See op.cit. note 205 in relation to the “responsible-journalism” defense which is contained in the draft 
legislation codifying the English law of defamation and which was before Parliament at the time of 
writing.
